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The Trotskyite Impact on Hoffa

The story of Farrell Dobbs would not be complete without chronicling the end of the Trotskyite remnant in Minneapolis, a dramatic episode which sheds additional light on the mind and character of Jimmy Hoffa. This was one of Hoffa's most vivid experiences, replete with goon squads, political intrigue, and coldly calculated power plays. If 1934 was the Trotskyite year of glory, a year which Dobbs and other Minneapolis leaders still recall with youthful militant vigor, 1941 saw their dismal collapse, a rude awakening from a satisfying dream.

THE MINNEAPOLIS PURGE

Dan Tobin had long been fearful of Marxist infiltration into the labor movement and, as early as 1935, the Teamster Constitution contained a clause barring Communists from membership. Tobin first tried to break the Dunnes' hold on the Minneapolis Teamsters in 1935-1936. He set up a rival Local 500 to take over the Trotskyite Local 574 and sent in Meyer Lewis, a top AFL organizer, to engineer the fight. The Dunne brothers, however, were liked and respected by both the rank and file and the city's Joint Council (particularly its president, William Brown), so this tactic failed. As a face-saving gesture, Tobin discovered the ideological differences separating the Stalinists and the Trotskyites, and lamely declared that only the former were not welcome in the IBT. He merged locals 574 and 500 into a new Local

544 which was run, it soon became apparent, by the old 574 leadership.

For several years, encouraged perhaps by his growing respect for Farrell Dobbs, Tobin let the Trotskyites alone. When several dissident members prepared a case against the Dunnes in 1938 and asked the court to appoint a receiver, Tobin refused to support the rebels. In fact, the judge (who was evidently not a great Trotskyite admirer) later complained that the indifference of the International and the Joint Council made it difficult for him to uphold the dissidents.[1] Instead, he simply fined the Dunnes $6000 for alleged misuse of funds and ordered Skoglund removed as local president, since, as a noncitizen, he was violating the International Constitution.

But suddenly, in the spring of 1941, Tobin began a savage attack on the 544 leaders. A close political ally of President Roosevelt, Tobin wanted to pledge the Teamsters to a war-preparedness program, as his Executive Board finally did in June, 1941. His attack may have resulted from fear of sabotage from the Trotskyites who opposed our going to war. In addition, Vince Dunne had angered the "old man" by successfully resisting his advocacy of compulsory arbitration at the 1940 Convention. Tobin had been granted increased power over the locals by constitutional changes at that convention, and this seemed like the opportune moment to act.[2]

A group of Local 544 rank and filers, calling itself the "Committee of 99" (and later the "Committee of 100") was becoming increasingly disgruntled with the Dunnes. One of the rebels was a recently-fired 544 organizer, who promised to tell all about the Dunnes' subversive activities. Others simply aspired to get for themselves the offices which the Trotskyites occupied. As Joe Padway, counsel for the Teamsters and the AFL, later explained to Tobin,

> . . . it is evident to me that their fight was not based on loyalty to the International. It was based on personal and political considerations. In fact, some of these fellows were members of the Socialist

Workers Party and they had been members for many months. They fell out with the leaders and withdrew from the Socialist Workers Party, and the hatred between them is very intense.[3]

The Local 544 dissidents held a meeting in March, 1941, and passed a resolution demanding that the International "step into Minneapolis and clean up an intolerable situation."[4] In April, a subcommittee of the General Executive Board, conducted by Secretary-Treasurer John Gillespie, met in Chicago with all concerned to examine whether 544's officers were "Communistic, alien, and grossly negligent and inefficient." The hearing centered totally about the first of these charges, and the results were largely predetermined, for the Dunnes had made no secret of their political affiliation.

Gillespie came to Chicago prepared to read a number of anti-Trotskyite statements. One typical declaration, said to have been provided by David Dubinsky, who was advising Tobin on Marxism, assured the IBT that, "The Socialist Workers Party is in reality more communistic than the Communist Party. . . . Trotsky, when serving under Lenin in Russia, was even more radical and communistic and hateful of our form of government than either Lenin or Stalin. . . ." The May and succeeding issues of the International's official magazine were replete with similar warnings. Finally, at the June Teamster Executive Board meeting, the Socialist Workers Party was classified as a "subversive, revolutionary party" from which all officers and members had to withdraw, and Local 544 was instructed to request trusteeship, placing control directly in Tobin's hands.*

Dave Beck was dispatched to Minneapolis to inform the Dunnes of the Board's decision and, according to Dobbs, to offer a compromise measure whereby the Tobin-appointed trustee would wield only a veto power. Beck was scheduled to arrive on June 11. On June 9, Farrell Dobbs attended the first general meeting of Local 544 he had been to in over a year. Without the benefit of secret ballot, and hurling epithets such as "tyrant, dictator, and union-buster" at Tobin, the membership voted

* All 544 leaders had formally resigned from the SWP shortly after the March resolution, although their loyalties remained unchanged.

almost unanimously to secede from the Teamsters and jump to the CIO.

Denny Lewis, head of the United Construction Workers Organizing Committee, enthusiastically wired the Dunnes, "Will be happy to charter a local union of truck drivers and helpers in the Minneapolis area. . . . We visualize this move on the part of the truck drivers in Minneapolis into our organization as the first step towards the complete organization of truck drivers in the United States in the CIO."[5] These sentiments were echoed a few days later in a telegram from Denny Lewis' famous brother, John L. Lewis. A Motor Transport and Allied Workers Industrial Union was established, and a CIO staff was sent in under veteran United Mine Workers organizer Frank Barnhart. Detroit and the nearby Michigan cities of Flint and Pontiac, as well as Minneapolis, became the center of the new CIO campaign. With this series of maneuvers and countermaneuvers, open war had been declared.

During the following weeks, hundreds of Teamsters descended upon Minneapolis, in an attempt to keep the truck drivers in the IBT. T. T. Neal, then director of the Central States Drivers Council, was appointed trustee over the shell of 544-AFL, and Joe Casey (son of San Francisco's famous Teamster leader "Bloody Mike"), Dutch Woxberg (an able West Coast organizer who played a continuing important role, until 1961, under Beck and Hoffa), and Meyer Lewis (who had developed useful contacts in 1935-1936) were assigned the job of filling the empty shell with members. Neal was in charge of the office, Woxberg the field, and Casey was responsible for general supervision and negotiations. All contracts had expired on June 1. "Scores of cars, carrying an estimated 200 AFL men, cruised the warehouse district and the larger plants, putting the pressure on, where necessary, to sign up drivers and helpers."[6]

On June 17, Padway wrote to Tobin:

The sending in of the men made a tremendous impression with our membership and with the public. Everyone now sees that the Inter-

national Brotherhood of Teamsters is girded for the fight and that it has the men and the resources with which to make it. I understand that several of the secessionists have expressed a desire to quit the Dunnes and come back to the Teamsters. . . . There even are rumors and reports that the Dunnes themselves, now think they acted unwisely and hastily. They thought that they would get unanimous support from the Joint Council and that the CIO of Minnesota would welcome them with open arms. Instead, there is a tremendous opposition of the local CIO officials to the Dunnes. . . .

(Hatred between the Trotskyites and the Stalinist-inclined CIO groups was even more intense than between either one of these and the non-Communist unionists. This may help to account for the unenthusiastic response which the Dunnes received in many quarters.)

A letter to Padway from his nephew and assistant, I. E. Goldberg, on June 28, praised the work of the outside organizers. "It is quite surprising that there has been little or no violence to date. . . . It is hardly believable that in dealing with such a tough situation and with fellows who are known killers, that there has not been any serious trouble. . . ." (The members of 544-CIO vigorously contested this view, claiming repeated violence against their supporters; perhaps the difference centered about the meaning of "serious" trouble.) Joe Casey, in a June 24 telephone conversation with Tom Flynn, said, "The outside boys can work in there and they will take all the abuse in the world. With the local fellows, when they get in an argument, they immediately get into a fist fight because of old sores around here. . . ."

Letters from Goldberg and Woxberg particularly commended the boys from Detroit, led by Jimmy Hoffa. It must have been a traumatic experience for young Hoffa, for today he recalls with strong emotion, "Vince Dunne was my friend." It is clear that Farrell Dobbs was his principal mentor. The competence and diligence of the Trotskyites had aroused Hoffa's admiration, and he found distasteful the task of breaking up a militant, well-functioning union. Nevertheless, Tobin was still the boss, and 544 was a rebel local, disobeying International orders and promoting dual unionism. Such behavior is looked upon as a cardinal sin in the American labor movement; and besides, in their Michigan drive, the rebels were encroaching on Hoffa's territory. His participation in the Minneapolis purge may have helped foster the ruthless quality for which he is known. That he did his job so effectively is evidence that he already possessed substantial quantities of the trait.

At first, the truck drivers were undecided which path to follow. As Casey described it in his telephone conversation with Flynn on June 24:

> Here is the kick-back we are getting now—that these fellows are like a pendulum on a clock which swings back and forth—CIO-AFL-CIO-AFL, depending entirely on who was the last group that talked to them. They say that the boys have two buttons—CIO in one pocket and AFL in the other, and they don't wear any button, but when an AFL comes up, they start putting on the AFL button.

Woxberg had a similar picture for Flynn three days later. "Our organizers will go into a plant and sign the membership and immediately CIO will come along and also sign them. This only shows that the membership are just waiting to ride the winning horse. . . ."

In a lengthy communication to Tobin on June 16, Padway reported on the lack of loyalty of the Joint Council toward the International. ". . . the officers of the Joint Council are very friendly to the Dunnes and it is my belief that some of them worked with them on this secession. . . . They may urge their unions to swing over if they think it is to their advantage to do so." So close were the battle lines drawn, Padway felt, that if the wrong man had been appointed trustee, "secession on the part of other locals, and particularly on the part of the leaders, would have taken place within a few days." As documentation for this, Padway observed that the Joint Council had just sold its newspaper, the *Northwest Organizer,* to the Dunnes, for a one-dollar bill.

Using a tactic which the Dunnes and Dobbs had themselves exploited, the Teamsters declared a national boycott on trucks

driven by CIO members. But more decisive were the behind-the-scenes legal and political moves which finally resulted in Teamster victory. A politically influential legal firm was retained, at great cost. Courts quickly ordered the old 544 to turn over its office, funds, and properties, to the International. Publication and distribution of the *Northwest Organizer* was enjoined, the judge remarking "that he felt the International ought to have stepped in sooner." [7] Padway and Woxberg "met with District Attorney Goff, the Chief of Police, and the Captain of Detectives, who promised us all protection and cooperation possible. . . ." [8]

Such assistance was indeed helpful, for at the end of September the Minnesota Labor Conciliator declared 544-AFL the certified bargaining agent for Minneapolis truck drivers, bypassing the unpredictable NLRB representation elections which 544-CIO persistently demanded. Conciliator Blair found that, "The public interest . . . requires that there should be one and only one bargaining representative for all the drivers" and announced that 544-AFL represented the majority.[9] Padway hailed this patently undemocratic procedure: "This is a marvelous victory for the Teamsters. It is the first certification of its kind anywhere in the country. Of course, it will be attacked, but between the time the attack comes up for final adjudication by any tribunal the victory will be complete, regardless of what the court should hold." [10] His message proved prophetic, and the workers never did have the opportunity to express their choice.

The final blow to the Dunnes and their friends was delivered by the United States Department of Justice. Late in June, in the midst of the turmoil described above, Socialist Workers Party headquarters in Minneapolis and St. Paul were raided by the FBI. In July there were indictments against 29 Party leaders, including the Dunnes, Dobbs, and five other 544 officials, based upon a Civil War sedition statute and the recently-passed Smith Act. The charges were conspiracy to overthrow the United States Government by force and violence, to engage in private military training for that purpose, and to spread disaffection among the armed forces.

The American Civil Liberties Union indignantly declared that:

> . . . the charges clearly raise issues of civil liberties in attacking utterances or publications in the absence of any overt acts or even of any "clear and present danger." . . . In our judgment, both statutes violate the first Amendment of the Constitution; and even if upheld could not be applied to this set of facts . . . we desire to call the government's attention to a series of circumstances which appear to indicate a gross impropriety on the part of government officials in securing the indictment. . . .[11]

The report went on to cite communications between Tobin and Roosevelt, wherein Tobin had described the flight of 544 to the CIO as "a regrettable and dangerous condition . . . we feel that while our country is in a dangerous position, those disturbers who believe in the policies of foreign, radical governments, must be in some way prevented from pursuing this dangerous course." [12] Roosevelt quickly obliged by agreeing that jurisdictional fights were not desirable. Shortly afterwards, came the FBI raids. The ACLU concluded

> . . . it seems reasonable to conclude that the government injected itself into the inter-union controversy in order to promote the interests of the one side which supported the administration's foreign and domestic policies. In our judgment, this is a highly improper use of the criminal law. Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that it has been a matter of common knowledge for some years that the Socialist Workers Party, an insignificant little group of extremists, has been strongly represented in the Minneapolis labor movement—alone of any city in the country. Nothing charged in the indictment is of recent origin. The situation in Minneapolis is no different now from that obtaining over the past five or ten years.[13]

Of course, two things had changed: we were about to go to war, and the Smith Act had just been passed.*

At the ensuing trial, which began in October, much of the

* Farrell Dobbs today disputes the view of the ACLU and other liberal groups that the Justice Department's moves were political payoffs from Roosevelt to Tobin. He believes that the war and general class issues motivated the government's attack on the Trotskyites. Whatever the immediate stimulus, the timing certainly helped the Teamsters.

testimony both pro and con came from union sources, and it developed that the FBI had been working with the "Committee of 99" for several months. Hoffa claims that he and his Detroit associates were invited to speak against the Dunnes, but refused. Charges against five of the defendants were dismissed by the judge due to lack of evidence, and five other defendants, including Miles Dunne, were found innocent by the jury. Those remaining, most notably Vince Dunne and Farrell Dobbs, were convicted and given varying sentences of twelve to eighteen months' duration.[14] The sentences were upheld on appeal in 1943. Many of the old 544 leaders spent little if any time in jail, but by the trial's end their spirit was broken and their power destroyed. Grant Dunne had committed suicide during the course of a nervous breakdown; [15] another defendant was acquitted of the conspiracy charge but received a five-year prison term for "embezzling" union dues and other properties which he had refused to turn over to the Teamsters; and Carl Skoglund had been held in jail for long periods on deportation charges, with bail placed at an impossible $25,000.

By the end of 1941, the Minneapolis purge was a *fait accompli.*

As trustee of Local 544, Tobin appointed T. T. Neal, in whose frequent absence the local was run by Secretary-Treasurer Sidney Brennan. Goldberg wrote to Padway on November 29, ". . . it is unfortunate that the situation has not produced any outstanding leader with the proper qualifications to carry on in face of our present problems." Brennan seemed the best, or least objectionable, man available; for he replaced Neal less than a year later, and in 1943 became an International vice-president. (In 1956, Brennan was convicted of dividing with three others a $5000 payoff from an employer, and lost his prestigious Teamster position.)[16]

Tobin's correspondence for years afterwards reveals an agonizing (if somewhat imaginative) anxiety about Trotskyite resurgence in Minneapolis and as far afield as Los Angeles. Former Dunne adherents were carefully kept out of the union. The

July, 1941 *International Teamster* cautioned, after listing their names, "Watch for them in the future everywhere. They may seek membership in your union, perhaps under false names." When Trotskyites were discovered working with the International Union of Operating Engineers (AFL), Tobin urged their expulsion. But the much-feared revival never came; and with the collapse of the old militant Local 544 came the end of the Trotskyite role in the Teamsters.

THE AFTERMATH IN DETROIT

While the fight for control of the Minneapolis Teamsters went on during the summer and fall of 1941, a closely related battle was brewing in Hoffa's home territory. In the wake of the Minneapolis purge came a major CIO assault on traditional Teamster jurisdiction, centering on the strongest CIO town in the country—Detroit.

When the Dunnes feared their local was about to be placed under trusteeship in June, 1941, they seceded to Denny Lewis' United Construction Workers' Organizing Committee (UCWOC), to serve as the nucleus of an anticipated surge of truck drivers into the CIO. Lewis' movement was underway by August and at its height from late September to early November, coinciding with the Trotskyite trial.*

The attack concentrated on Hoffa's automobile haulaway drivers, because of their proximity to CIO auto plants. UCWOC organizers brought in numerous signed applications and talked of holding labor board elections before the end of the year. CIO trouble-shooters cruised the area in cars from which they could quickly be dispatched as the need arose. Others acted simply as "strong-arm men," ready to beat up Teamster toughs.

Hoffa retaliated by picketing and boycotting establishments which signed with the insurgents, and by threatening to take

* An attempt at secrecy was made, but in formation leaked through; Tobin's informer sent in detailed daily reports on the activities of Lewis (and Hoffa as well) and these, locked away for many years in his personal files, were helpful in reconstructing the story.

jobs and union cards away from disloyal members. Assistance from the usually thrifty Tobin was obtained in the form of a $1300 monthly subsidy and top-level influence with CIO leaders. On the local level, informal understandings were reached between Hoffa and major Detroit CIO officials. When UCWOC called gatherings of dissident truck drivers, Hoffa's men patrolled the area, discouraging attendance, and then they tried to gain control of the meeting. Violence was standard operating procedure on both sides.

By the end of October, the UCWOC campaign, which had gotten off to such a vigorous start, was faltering. Aid had been expected from the United Automobile Workers (UAW-CIO) and requested at its September Executive Board meeting. But this proved overly optimistic, the first fatal flaw in Denny Lewis' plan. The UAW Executive Board grudgingly went on record (partly in response to the Retail, Wholesale Workers' experience in Detroit) as condemning the Teamsters for their "strong-arm methods and back-door agreements with management in their efforts to block legitimate organizing work by the CIO." The UAW voted support for "all CIO sister unions including the UCWOC." But as the weeks rolled by it became evident that this was an empty promise. Tobin was confidentially informed that Walter Reuther was "blocking any move by Thomas or Addes * toward support for the Turner [Denny Lewis] group . . . he feels that this campaign will cause a lot of trouble and bloodshed if it is continued." Largely due to Reuther's opposition, crucial UAW assistance to the anti-Hoffa forces never materialized.

Lacking financial subsidy from the UAW and other CIO unions, UCWOC's funds were short, and experienced organizers left as their remuneration was cut. Several of UCWOC's best men were arrested, leading them to charge that the police favored Hoffa. Internal feuding plagued the Denny Lewis organization; confusion and dissatisfaction prevailed. On October 21, the Wayne County CIO Council condemned the drive in a resolution promoted by Gus Scholle, president of the Michigan State CIO

* Walter Reuther, R. J. Thomas, and George Addes were major UAW leaders in 1941.

Council, and UAW leader, Dick Leonard. On November 4, the State Council expressed opposition to all raiding activities among workers producing and transporting defense goods.

And thus matters stood until the CIO Convention, scheduled for Detroit the week of November 17. This would be the showdown. Would John L. Lewis and his brother Denny receive the full backing of the CIO, or would they be rejected and possibly break away? This question dominated the Convention, and the UCWOC issue was only one ingredient in a perplexing brew.

From the very beginning, an atmosphere of tension and hostility pervaded the convention halls, and matters were not helped by the Mineworkers' refusal to stand and applaud for CIO President Philip Murray nor by Denny Lewis' "to hell with Murray" attitude. The Steelworkers and Amalgamated Clothing Workers caucused against Lewis, and were soon joined by Harry Bridges, Mike Quill, and representatives of textile and rubber workers. Scores of union officials converged on Detroit to assist in the fight. Communist sympathizers, in particular, feared injuring our defense program and delaying aid to Russia, which had shortly before been invaded by Germany. Fist fights broke out among the delegates, one involving Gus Scholle and Denny Lewis. Finally, members of the Lewis group were forced to stay in their hotel rooms between sessions because of the strength of personal animosities. When Frank Barnhart took the floor to discuss the Minneapolis trial, he received no applause. In contrast, Murray was reelected by a great ovation, and in his address to the convention, warned that raiding of rival organized groups must cease. A resolution to back the UCWOC drive was never even reported out of committee; the Lewis forces in the CIO had been resoundingly defeated by the convention's end.

During the following weeks Reuther, Scholle, and Tracey Doll (president of the Wayne County Council) actively promoted a "peace movement" in Detroit. When Hoffa won a big pay raise for his members, enthusiasm among recalcitrant truck drivers for the new organization waned, and they flocked back to the Teamsters. On February 2, 1942, UCWOC abruptly moved its headquarters out of the Hoffman Building where the rest of the

CIO was housed, in preparation, as it later developed, for Lewis' imminent departure from the federation. UCWOC activities against the Teamsters were sporadic, weak, and of little consequence thereafter.

In summary, the campaign to organize the truck drivers along industrial lines was caught in the interplay of power between John L. Lewis and Philip Murray. It was this breach which first opened the door of the CIO to the Dunnes, but which also doomed any chance of success. Reuther and much of the vital UAW bitterly opposed the drive, resenting Lewis and desirous of avoiding any unnecessary friction with Hoffa, the union leader with whom Reuther was later to share Detroit. Other CIO officials were anxious to prevent a defense-production stoppage which was likely under full-scale raiding. Added to this was the personal antagonism which many CIO delegates felt toward Denny Lewis, believing that his primary motivation was "big money and a big job."

The UCWOC efforts were run with surprising ineptitude. There was much infighting; funds were low; and there were brawls and jurisdictional battles with potential friends in the UAW and the Steelworkers. When Hoffa finally came through with a highly successful contract, the fight was over. After some initial success among the auto haulaway drivers in Flint and the smaller towns and companies of northern Michigan, the attack on Hoffa which had begun with the Minneapolis purge in the summer of 1941 was dead.

IMPRINTS OF THE MARXIST IDEOLOGY

Hoffa's concept of the function and fate of our political economy has been indelibly shaped by the radical left. In the 1930's, he frequented lecture halls and street corners where Communists and anarchists spouted their views, but most important were the lessons learned from the Dunne brothers and Farrell Dobbs. The crude Marxist business cycle theory preached by these Trotskyite acquaintances from Minneapolis, at a time when their ideas

seemed verified by millions of jobless men, deeply colors Hoffa's thinking to this day.

Hoffa has an intuitive Marxist picture of a capitalist economy: automation—overproduction—unemployment—more automation —more overproduction—more unemployment—and so it goes. The impending disaster is thought to be hastened by an inevitable trend toward monopolization, which our antitrust laws are powerless to prevent. During the next decade Hoffa foresees General Motors, possibly together with Ford, swallowing up the automobile industry, the number of major railroads reduced to five and airlines to four, and eight supermarket chains controlling the retail grocery field as warehouse automation revolutionizes food distribution. Similarly, he anticipates a shrinkage of trucking carriers from the many thousands which exist today to a few hundred, with a handful of transcontinental lines dominating long-distance hauling.

Hoffa favors this movement toward industrial concentration; he is intrigued by the increased efficiency which larger business units permit. However, higher productivity means fewer jobs unless output rises, and herein lies the crux of the problem. He sees no way for us to take off the market the fruits of our huge and ever-growing productive capacity; the only possible outcome is a glut of unused commodities and layoffs of unnecessary workers. Hoffa insists that the depression which he, like many others, predicted at the end of World War II has been only temporarily postponed.

The rationale for this course of events has been incompletely worked out in his mind. But basically, he seems to feel that human wants are sharply limited by nature; that we are already at the upper boundary of our ability to absorb goods and services. Our remaining peacetime needs can be quickly satiated, he maintains—any structure can be erected within 90 days, and an overabundance of buildings and roads can be achieved in one year's time. He believes few major growth sectors are left. Thus, in keeping with Marxist ideology but in contrast to the beliefs of most "liberal" American trade unionists, Hoffa views government

measures to alleviate unemployment, including monetary and fiscal policy or a legislative cut in the work week, as only a temporary palliative, too superficial and ineffective to counter the fundamental instability of our economy.

The final result, which Hoffa discusses frequently in private conversation, is the radicalization of the American labor force, and the flowering of left-wing political movements. Despite his emotional attraction to a vigorous free enterprise economy, his numerous private financial deals, his advocacy of business experience for union leaders, and his support of many Republican candidates, Hoffa believes (just as he was taught by Dobbs in the 1930's) that capitalism is doomed. He is in the incongruous position of one who likes the present system, but does not believe it can work. This sense of expectancy helps explain his buoyancy in the face of the Kennedy diatribes, for the denouement will not be long in coming, he feels, and he plans sufficient flexibility to go with the winner. Viewed in this light, Hoffa's alignment with certain radical unions (for example, the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, and Harry Bridges' International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union) is more than simply a momentary expedient brought on by his expulsion from the AFL-CIO.

We have several times heard Hoffa predict a return to the violence in the streets that he witnessed during the Great Depression. Should this happen, he is prepared to lead the hungry masses forth. His dynamic personality, flowing oratory, brilliant mind, shrewd knowledge of strategy, and relative youth, would all combine to make him a logical candidate for radical leadership—were his pessimistic prognostications concerning the American economy to prove correct.

7

Hoffa's Rise to Power: Building the Central States Drivers Council

Farrell Dobbs' departure from the CSDC in 1940 was followed by a struggle for control of the Council. Mike Healy, of Local 710, was chosen Council president; Hoffa replaced Dobbs as negotiating chairman and became vice-president in 1941, two formal positions he still holds. However, the CSDC was not Hoffa's primary concern during the war, for he was busy holding the lid on his own tempestuous local, expanding Teamster jurisdiction and protecting it against CIO intruders in Detroit, consolidating his control over Michigan trucking, and manipulating the Midwestern collective agreement for car hauling. He was also learning how to out-maneuver the numerous wartime government agencies, and toward the end of the war directing an enthusiastic top-down organizing campaign in Detroit and environs.

WARTIME AND HOFFA'S EMERGENCE

In the early forties power within the CSDC was shared by Hoffa, O'Brien, Healy, and a representative of President Tobin. Tobin had sent in T. T. Neal to succeed Dobbs as his personal

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Jimmy Hoffa's Mind and Personality

Jimmy Hoffa is one of the country's best known and most powerful men. To understand his impact on society it is important to understand how his mind works. Is he rationally or emotionally motivated? What are the standards which govern his conduct, the qualities he respects and tries to emulate?

These are questions which some of Hoffa's closest lieutenants ponder at great length, and they are not easy to answer, for Hoffa's is a complex and paradoxical mentality, with both public image and self-image often a caricature of reality. He possesses a brilliant mind, but one which in many respects is non-intellectual. He has built a well-deserved reputation for ruthlessness, but beneath the tough exterior is a genuine concern for others. He is a devoted family man, although his life centers about his work. He sees enemies and spies all around him, yet is unnecessarily trusting of a new acquaintance. He views the world in terms of power relationships rather than in terms of what is right and wrong, yet he is motivated by a deeply instilled sense of morality; his behavior seems unethical and uncouth to some, while in others his personal drive and magnetism arouse an unswerving loyalty. He is his own harsh taskmaster, a skillful actor on a broad stage who adeptly plays his contrasting roles as the occasion demands and, like John L. Lewis at his heyday, loves to squeeze the maximum drama out of any inherently

explosive situation. We have spent hundreds of hours watching him operate, talked to dozens of his acquaintances and associates, but still are not completely certain exactly what is honest and what is contrived in the contradictory threads which make up his personality. He is a man of so many quickly-changeable moods that we cannot help but wonder if even he is able to make this distinction.

THE BRILLIANT NON-INTELLECTUAL MIND

Hoffa's outstanding asset is his agile, well-disciplined mind. For a long time the nation's press implied that Hoffa was a thug who hired others to do his thinking; reporters described Hoffa as the "muscle" and his chief assistant, Harold Gibbons, as the "brains." Of all the stereotypes concerning Hoffa, this one is farthest from the truth.

Hoffa looks upon his mental capacities as a major resource which must be trained and controlled. He attacks what he calls "file cabinet minds—minds which have been taught not to think or remember, but just to scribble information on a piece of paper and file it away." In a favorite lecture, he holds up a pencil and comments, "This here sharp pointed instrument is one of the most dangerous in the world. It is a crutch that people lean on instead of using their brains. It has wrecked more men than anything I know of."

He carefully avoids "the sharp pointed instrument," determined to keep his file cabinet *in* his mind, a mind which he perceives as containing many compartments for different sets of topics. He rarely takes notes, especially on important, complicated matters, for these best provide mental exercise—and besides a written record might someday prove embarrassing. On only two occasions did we see him write memos to himself; these pertained to the relevant contract sections for forthcoming grievance cases, and were thrown away as soon as the decisions were reached.

When deep in thought Hoffa will sometimes cup his hands, place them over his nose, and point his fingers toward his fore-

head. He explains that he is telling his mind to organize its various compartments and to separate emotional from rational considerations. He claims this device works well, and urges his son to use it too.

Hoffa's curiosity is strong on subjects like the future of the American economy, forthcoming labor legislation, the effects of automation, and the changing structure of the transportation industry. He engages in lengthy speculation and spirited debate on these topics with Teamster associates, professional acquaintances, employer representatives, and college gatherings. His extemporaneous deliveries abound in metaphor and dramatic innuendo.

But his curiosity does not extend beyond that which is directly or indirectly connected with his job; broader pursuits are for the "eggheads" or "squares" who are "lost in the clouds and don't know what makes the world go round." For example, although daughter Barbara once got him to sit quietly for an hour at San Francisco's operatic Bocce Ball, his concern for music, art, and other cultural matters is virtually nil. On another occasion, he listened intently while his musical General Organizer James Harding played Chopin at the piano. Afterwards, however, he seemed to feel it inappropriate and unduly distracting for a Teamster organizer to develop such talent and likewise for him to express appreciation or interest.

Similarly, his literary interests are slight. While a penetrating scrutinizer of detail in collective bargaining contracts, and an avid reader of newspapers and magazines, he rarely opens a book, and never one unrelated to his work or position. Thus, Hoffa may share John L. Lewis' penchant for showmanship, but he lacks Lewis' knowledge and love of serious drama.

He also finds it difficult to abstract, to leave the realm of the human and the precise. If you are talking about automation, he will tell you about the hundreds of men who will be laid off by Associated Trucking, the thousands in longshoring, and the hundreds of thousands by General Motors. In fact, he tends to discount the existence of that which cannot be expressed concretely.

Finally, he is not historically oriented. "Labor history is a lot of nonsense," he sometimes says. "Sam Gompers was eternally drunk. Dan Tobin drank too much and lived too long—you won't find any of this mentioned in your history books. Franklin Roosevelt," he adds, "was a great man, but he's only been dead twenty years and nobody is interested in him. And if I should die tomorrow, ten years from now nobody would care about the name Hoffa or probably even have heard of it." In keeping with this disdainful attitude, he periodically destroys his Detroit files and is contemplating doing the same in Washington, a disaster for the labor historian and, of course, an impediment to future government investigators.

Yet, many of Hoffa's actions belie these declarations, for he is clearly determined to leave his impact on the flow of human events. Furthermore, he has obviously absorbed crucial lessons from the past. He has consciously learned from the mistakes of former Teamster presidents Tobin and Beck, and has evolved historically-based principles of behavior.

QUICK DECISIONS AND POSITIVE ACTION

Hoffa has established a well-founded reputation for clearing his desk after each day of rapid decision-making, with sleep coming easily to an unanxious mind. The occasional breakdown in his capacity for positive action is a source of great frustration. One day in San Francisco he inexplicably stalled all morning and afternoon on several matters which demanded immediate attention. Finally we raced off in a cab where he delivered a persuasive soliloquy on the importance of making prompt, irrevocable decisions. Amazed, I pointed out the incongruity. His reply suggested he was only half aware that he was giving the sermon to himself.

His most pronounced failure in this respect is his incapacity to fire people. This puzzles his lieutenants, both those who merit support as well as those who wonder why they remain. He keeps the good and the bad, the capable and the incompetent; he simply delegates more tasks to those who perform well. Some

individuals at his Washington headquarters vehemently oppose practically everything he represents; few organizations would permit the extreme sentiments of disloyalty we heard voiced by top staff members in the Teamster cafeteria. Though Hoffa is fully aware of their feelings, they stay on at fancy salaries. One dissenter expressed the fear that Hoffa might fire him some day in a fit of anger. We quickly reassured him, pointing out that Hoffa never fires anyone, and defied him to give a single example. After a lengthy pause, perceptibly relieved, he acknowledged that he had "never thought of it that way." We had made our contribution to Teamster morale!

To an impressive degree, however, Hoffa comes up with the necessary endless decisions, often after only a few moments' contemplation. He is particularly quick to resolve collective bargaining problems in freight. Here he has planned for years ahead and he knows where he is going and how to get there. Thus, when a specific issue arises, he need only fit it into his over-all framework to produce the appropriate response. Similarly, he has carefully considered whom to appoint should major vacancies occur in his hierarchy. He claims that when the occasion arises he can get on the phone, call the relevant parties, and announce the official replacement in less than half an hour.

Moreover, procrastination is sometimes part of his deliberate strategy. While he refuses to fire undesired associates, he has developed slower, more diplomatic means for achieving the same end. He undermines their political position, assigns them non-sensitive tasks, and has established a lucrative pension plan to entice them into early retirement. Hoffa contends that this policy prevents him from making enemies, and he is greatly concerned with gaining friends. The delaying tactics he applies in lawsuits against himself or the union are also premeditated for, "Problems have a way of solving themselves. If you stall long enough the troubles, or trouble-makers, will disappear."

PHYSICAL FITNESS, MENTAL TOUGHNESS

Hoffa's self-discipline extends to body as well as mind. He takes great pride in his muscular 5-foot, 5-inch, 180-pound frame. Indeed, he sees physical fitness as the primary prerequisite to an alert mind, and physical inactivity as the cause of mental lethargy; hence, his strenuous morning calisthenics, and frequent rub-downs by the masseur in his Washington headquarters.

Hoffa regards food as fuel for a machine, and ordinarily dispatches the fat from the lean in roast beef with the dexterity of a surgeon. But when particularly nervous, this self-control breaks down, as it did during his Nashville trial when he gained twelve pounds in two months. He looks back with disgust at such self-indulgence, and goes on a crash diet.

Physical fitness helps explain Hoffa's respect for some of his Detroit deputies and for General Organizers like Jim Harding and Roy Williams. However, his attempt to impart this fanaticism to others has been notably unsuccessful; he couldn't get Gibbons to work out with him, and his project to trim paunchy Sid Zagri fell by the wayside. When he called for daily exercises by all personnel in the Washington headquarters only one secretary showed up.

Hoffa is proud of his seemingly inexhaustible energy. The trouble-shooter who kept closest to his whirlwind pace was Dick Kavner. Finally, Kavner became ill and was incapacitated for several months. He received no sympathy from the boss; instead Hoffa taunted him for his weakness. Hoffa and his lieutenants are not supposed to succumb to ordinary human frailties; Hoffa refuses to acknowledge a heart attack he purportedly had in 1958, or any other illness.

Closely related is Hoffa's desire to appear tough in his approach toward people. He proudly proclaims, "If I were an employer I'd be the meanest bastard that God ever created." He becomes embarrassed at the mention of such evidence of "softness" and "sentiment" as a large contribution to charity or assistance to a friend in need.

The personification of toughness which Hoffa has striven to build served him well during McClellan Committee days. Beck's "respectable businessman" image quickly collapsed under Congressional exposure and Gibbons' "social reform" image suffered a severe temporary blow, but Hoffa's "tough guy" image was not vulnerable to this type of attack.

THE PURITANICAL STREAK

As part of his campaign for maximizing mental and physical strength, Hoffa abstains from alcohol, tobacco, and even from coffee. He paces the smoke-filled conference room, emptying ashtrays and opening windows. He is particularly strong on the no-liquor principle. I once asked his close friend, Abe Gordon, if he had ever seen Hoffa drink. Gordon replied that Hoffa used to consume beer occasionally. When I later mentioned this to Hoffa, he furiously denied it. Few associates will drink in his presence; to do so is a sign of defiance or stupidity, for he is anxious to learn of their liquor habits and his judgments are severe. In this respect he goes against the grain of most Teamster officials, for whom drinking is an important part of living. For example, Hoffa claims Tobin used to go to bed at 4 A.M. dead drunk, but it was a mark of pride that he could rise and, as Hoffa describes it, "bellow forth in complete control of a meeting at 8."

Hoffa is also puritanical about sex. He is embarrassed by a strip tease show or a sexy joke, and berates those who enjoy "such things"; as a result, his associates constrain descriptions of their exploits when he is around. When General Organizer Jack Goldberger arranged a birthday party for Hoffa at Bimbo's in San Francisco in February, 1962, Mrs. Hoffa moved her husband away from the aisle to obstruct his view of Lily St. Cyr. As Mrs. Hoffa later explained, she was fearful that he would stomp out in protest, as he once did at New York's Latin Quarter when he felt the act was corrupting the morals of his fourteen-year-old son.

Hoffa regards drinking and sexual laxity as a weakness for

which he has no sympathy, a lack of self-discipline which consumes time and impairs effectiveness. His disillusionment with some of his intellectual associates stems from their extraordinary propensities in this respect; he cannot comprehend how intellectual and social idealism can be sincere when gaudily sprinkled with sexual promiscuity and alcohol.

Most companions have their favorite stories about his austere tastes. Allen Dorfman is fond of telling about the evening they spent in Rome on their way to dedicate a children's home in Israel financed by a 1956 Hoffa testimonial dinner. Dorfman and the others were preparing to do the town when boss Jimmy insisted that ice cream sodas were all they needed before going to bed. Associates such as Harold Gibbons and Abe Gordon worry that the absence of "natural outlets" leaves Hoffa with no release for his excess nervous tension and energy.

However, Hoffa's austerity does not mean that he completely eschews the better things in life. His $75,000 annual salary (plus expenses) is the highest of any union officer in the country. He is an avid consumer of the country's best steaks, roast beef, and cracked crab; of ornate hotels, country clubs, and flashy motels. He likes to hold Board meetings in "his" hostelries, built with capital supplied by "his" Pension Fund.* No longer does he live in the $6800 Detroit working-class home which magazine writers have placed him in for years; that house has been "lent" to a young assistant, Chuckie O'Brien, whom Hoffa raised as a member of his family. Hoffa enjoys a richly furnished Washington, D.C. apartment, rent paid by the International, and his wife dashes around the country in the finest clothes. He relishes large, luxurious automobiles and feels his lieutenants merit the most conspicuous, costly models (Cadillacs for his Detroit business agents, a modest Pontiac Bonneville con-

* *Time* describes one of his favorites as follows: "For gaudiness nothing quite compares with Dallas' Cabana motel, owned by the improbable combination of Doris Day and the Teamsters Union. Five fountains jet water 50 feet into the air under red, yellow and blue lights. A life-sized lobby mural of naked Romans embroiled in orgy entices—or repels—the traveler. A Texan can stand tall on the lobby balcony, see 37 images of himself in gold-tinted mirrors." *Time,* January 17, 1964, pp. 19-20.

vertible for himself). In other words, Hoffa may be puritanical, but he is not a Mennonite, nor is he a typical Rambler owner.

A DEVOTED FAMILY MAN

Hoffa's personal propriety carries over into his family life. He is extremely devoted to his family, and despite his hectic schedule usually manages to spend part of each weekend with his attractive wife, Josephine, whom he met on a picket line and married in 1937. Like many self-made men, he wants to protect his children from the deprivations he endured. In 1962 he footed the bill for a fancy tour through Europe for his son, and he boasts that he has enough set aside to take care of his daughter for the rest of her life.

He was gravely concerned during the McClellan Committee period over the effects of the newspaper headlines on his wife and children, who until then had been shielded from his complex operations. Lieutenants worried for fear that Kennedy might attempt to shame his family, and for fear that the boss would be unable to control his volatile temper. Once, when Kennedy suggested calling on Josephine to testify about financial transactions registered in her maiden name, Hoffa responded protectively that she knew nothing of business affairs and he would answer all questions.

He is proud of his children's accomplishments, and probably also of their clean-cut wholesomeness, so different from his public image. Once, when a senator commented on the need for greater ethics in our society, Hoffa retorted that his son and daughter had been brought up as decent and moral as anyone could find.

He reported to the 1961 Convention, "I am happy to say that my son was named an [high school] all-star for the entire State of Michigan, while the trouble was at its height, on his own glory, not on his old man's." [1] The husky younger Hoffa went on to Michigan State, which was anxious to make use of his football talents. But at the end of his first year Hoffa demanded to know, "Are you going to college to get an education or to play games?" and he proudly relates his son's choice

of the former. After a college major in economics, the son is now studying law at the University of Michigan.

The 1961 Convention was also informed that, "My daughter finished college [Phi Beta Kappa at Michigan's Albion College]. She is teaching English, History, and French. It is the first generation of either a Hoffa or Poszywak, my wife's family, on her mother's, her father's, my mother's, and my father's side to have had opportunity to complete college." [2] While apparently disdaining ivory-tower book learning, Hoffa at times still manifests the often-exaggerated deference toward a college education found in those who have not had one.

Teamster officials close to Hoffa used to see daughter Barbara as the only close family counterpart, a loyal and dependable rock on whose youthful energies Hoffa felt he could count. At a dinner I had with the family during the Miami Convention in July, 1961, Hoffa tried to entice her into returning with him to Israel to spend another month touring the country which had so intrigued him in the course of their 1956 visit. However, Barbara was not interested. Shortly afterwards, she announced her engagement to Robert Crancer, son of a steel company owner from St. Louis. Hoffa was shaken by his daughter's sudden decision and some of his associates feel it took the best of his stoicism to maintain his stiff upper lip and appear his usual cocksure, happy self for the press—at the elaborate full-day Polish-style October marriage ceremony and feast.

Not only is Hoffa a strong family man himself, he also has great respect for others who display this quality. It is a major point to a lieutenant's credit if he can fill the bill. Few do, partly because Hoffa keeps them fully occupied, but some try to establish this reputation because of the impression they know it will make on their boss.

THE HOFFA TEMPER

In sharp contrast to Hoffa's assiduously cultivated self-discipline is his temper. Increasingly pressed by the aftermath of the McClellan Committee, he flares up viciously at his asso-

ciates, and undermines the self-respect of those he admires the most. His vocabulary is spiced by vivid profanity, for he can outswear the most vociferous of his vice-presidents (except for Tom Flynn).

Is the temper display an act, put on to keep his boys in harness? If the start of the performance is deliberate, the principal player is often carried away by the end. Sometimes, the flash of temper seems perversely designed to impress a spectator with Hoffa's monopoly on ability and his dominance of the Teamsters. His key people realize that if they are inexplicably catching hell over the phone, it is probably for the benefit of a third person in the room with Hoffa. "That stupid bastard," Hoffa mutters after putting back the receiver, "I had it all set up for him and he let it slip through his fingers."

Contrary to Hoffa's belief, the most common reaction of the bewildered observer is one of embarrassment, antagonism, and disgust. Hoffa must inevitably be undercutting his own position, for these are *his* lieutenants he attacks. For example, General Organizer Jack Goldberger went to considerable efforts to introduce three potential supporters to Hoffa in April, 1962, whereupon Hoffa insulted Goldberger in their presence. Deeply offended, Goldberger said they could talk about it later and walked away. The three onlookers were repelled by Hoffa's rude conduct for, "If he does not have respect for you, Jack, whom does he respect?"

Hoffa's vitriolic temper is judiciously selective in its choice of objects. His major subordinates are the most likely candidates, especially Gibbons and those closely associated with Gibbons, whom he perceives as threats to his power. Gibbons commented in 1962, "The first few times Jimmy blew up at me he apologized. He doesn't bother any more." He often damned and belittled Dick Kavner, and even threatened to fire him, although Kavner was one of his brightest and hardest workers, as Hoffa boasted to others—when Kavner was not around.

In contrast, Hoffa is always amicable to the public, calm and reasonable before television cameras. He can close the door on a stormy session with his lieutenants, quickly change his mood

and joke with a reporter, careful not to suggest that anything is wrong, even when the outlook is worst. For example, repeated newspaper accounts of Hoffa's carefree confidence during the Nashville trial in the fall of 1962 clash with his lieutenants' description of the tension and gloom which actually prevailed.

Local union officials are courted with the patient voice, helpful manner, and contrived finesse of an experienced politician; but they are often loudly cursed immediately afterwards for their arrogance and stupidity. With the rank and file he will dally jocosely in informal groups, frankly answering their questions until pulled away by his assistants for pressing business. He rarely attacks his vice-presidents (except for Gibbons), for each has a vote on the powerful Executive Board, and Secretary-Treasurer John English, whose support in 1957 was crucial, is treated with respect and dignity. Thus, Hoffa usually lets loose his terrible temper in a small group, against his closest associates, where he anticipates only mild negative ramifications.

A major exception occurred in the spring of 1962. Hoffa's temper had been rising to a crescendo, pushed further by each new Teamster indictment. His humiliation of assistants was at its height; to avoid contact with their boss, some ceased making suggestions or even reporting in from the field. Those close to him feared for his heart. Finally, in May, Hoffa slugged Sam Baron, a staff member whom he knew to be disloyal, a mistake which brought him legal complications and bad publicity. After the Baron episode his temper amazingly subsided until the long Nashville trial in the fall, which caused him to ventilate his frustrations once again.

An episode with more far-reaching consequences occurred in November-December, 1963, when Gibbons finally reacted against years of exposure to Hoffa's temper. The final straw was Hoffa's abusive response to a letter of condolence which Gibbons had drafted after President Kennedy's assassination. Hollering, "God damn it, I'm not a hypocrite," Hoffa also lambasted Gibbons and Steinberg for wanting to close the Washington headquarters the day of the funeral. Gibbons waited until the Executive Board meeting two weeks later and then dramatically resigned

as executive assistant, carrying with him five others, including Steinberg and Kavner, and sparking rumors of an ouster movement against Hoffa. It would be naïve to believe that the Kennedy issue was the only reason for these resignations, for many philosophical and operational differences have long separated Hoffa and the Gibbons group. On the other hand, Hoffa's frequent explosions made it difficult, if not impossible, for deep personal loyalties to develop.

Hoffa's temper is the irrational, unsystematic part of his personality, a weakness which he seems unable or unwilling to correct. After a bad outburst he often says, in semi-apology to those around him, "If I can't get mad at my friends, who can I get mad at?" His accompanying but unspoken thought may be, "Otherwise, I might be forced to get mad at myself."

THE INFALLIBILITY DOCTRINE

Hoffa looks upon retrospection as futile and self-inhibiting; with apparent sincerity he maintains that he has never made a mistake. Precisely what does this signify to him? What is the function of this self-proclaimed infallibility? Does it help or hinder him?

One thing it means is, "I made the best decision I could at the time, with the limited knowledge at hand." At this level of definition it is difficult to challenge his claim, and it helps prevent him from crying over spilt milk.

For example, he freely admits that his business associate, Henry Lower, made questionable use of over $100,000 entrusted to him in the Sun Valley project, thereby causing Hoffa tremendous legal difficulty and some of his worst publicity. But despite this he refuses to label his relationship with Lower a mistake because, "After all, how was I to know he was a dope addict?"

Similarly, many Teamster officials feel that his first major appointment after becoming president—the choice of Los Angeles' Frank Matula as an International trustee—was unwise. At the time of the appointment Matula was out of jail briefly on appeal from a perjury conviction; in addition, his selection

caused great resentment in California, where there is much hostility toward Matula's personality and skepticism about his competence. Hoffa made the appointment impetuously, without consulting the California Teamsters, although he was then unfamiliar with the West Coast situation. Yet, despite the obvious dissatisfaction, he will not pause to consider whether he made a mistake, whether a better choice might have been possible with further thought. The decision is past, and by definition, it was correct.

Hoffa almost admitted to us that his handling of the New York situation in 1955-1957 was not optimal. The chartering of the seven "paper locals" had opened him to charges of underworld ties and undemocratic procedures before the McClellan Committee, and was an important factor leading to the Teamster expulsion from the AFL-CIO. Although "his man" Johnny O'Rourke was elected president of the Teamsters' New York Joint Council and International vice-president in 1957, O'Rourke quickly demonstrated an independent spirit and refused to accept Hoffa's control. By the early sixties, O'Rourke emerged as Hoffa's most vigorous opponent.

Hoffa shrugs off such seeming mistakes by observing, "It's not the battle that counts, but the war." He believes that little by little he can wear out and outwear the resistance. Jim Harding, one of his most competent and loyal lieutenants, is fond of stating, "It's difficult to quarrel with success. And so far Hoffa has ultimately landed on top in almost every internal union fight."

As an inevitable consequence of the infallibility doctrine, Hoffa never takes the blame when anything goes wrong—as, of course, it often does. If a Pension Fund investment turns sour, the reason is poor management, never bad judgment on the part of the Hoffa-dominated trustees who granted the loan. Generally, the scapegoat is one of his lieutenants. For example, during the 1961 Western negotiations Hoffa made the virtually impossible promise that the wage differential between Los Angeles and San Francisco would be eliminated. When this was not accomplished he called a special meeting of Los Angeles'

turbulent Local 208 to calm the disappointed membership, one of the most difficult sessions he has ever led. For over six hours Hoffa faced the stormy rank and file who at times seemed ready to pull him down from the stage and beat him up. Immediately afterwards, he blasted Harding, who had accompanied him, for not preventing the mob scene. Harding later commented that he would take such a tongue lashing from no one but Hoffa. Surely, Hoffa must realize that such accusations are unjustified. Yet he is prone to make them, giving full vent to his temper. In a sense he is privately refusing to accept his responsibility as chief executive by ascribing the accompanying difficulties and errors to someone else's failure rather than his own.

With key lieutenants frequently in the doghouse for "mistakes" not of their making, morale has been lowered and communications obstructed within the higher echelons of the union. Realizing that their boss will not accept criticism, many subordinates have become highly polished "yes men," expressing their frank opinions only behind his back. However, with these exceptions, the impact of the infallibility doctrine on Hoffa has probably been positive, enabling him to avoid fruitless and paralyzing brooding over yesterday's actual and potential mistakes.

HOFFA'S FEAR OF KENNEDY

Between 1957 and 1964, Hoffa's life was dominated by his fear of "that little monster," Robert Kennedy. Under Kennedy's direction, Hoffa believes, FBI agents followed him wherever he went, tapped his phone, opened his mail, and beamed electronic listening devices on him from half a mile away, aided by invisible powder they had rubbed onto his clothes. During the Miami Convention in 1961 Hoffa warned the delegates that Kennedy had sent female spies to pry secrets out of them and ordered them to avoid strangers. He was also certain that Kennedy would attempt to block the Convention, a move which never occurred. He claims that dozens of FBI agents—disguised as bellhops, desk clerks, doormen, maids and waiters—swarmed

about the hotels where his Executive Board met and negotiations were held. He is convinced that officials of his own organization, including at least two vice-presidents, reported to the FBI. Many lieutenants suspected that their offices and even their homes were "bugged"—if not by Kennedy, then by Hoffa, and possibly both.

Besides this continual surveillance, Hoffa believes Kennedy tried to trick him into committing perjury. On one occasion during the McClellan Committee hearings, Kennedy pushed him to make a categorical statement, knowing full well, Hoffa believes, that Hoffa had just been misinformed on that particular question by Teamster officials from New York. Hoffa first dogmatically asserted the false information, then hedged, paused, and said he would have to check. Suspicious, he stormed back to his headquarters and discovered that he had indeed been misled.*

In addition, he believes that Kennedy used pressure tactics to force others to move against him; that, with this purpose in mind, the Internal Revenue Service combed the tax returns of Teamster officials and key employers; that the FBI stole Teamster records and then accused the union leaders of destroying them; and that Pension Fund borrowers were indicted on a variety of charges. In each case, he claims, the Justice Department threatened prosecution unless the individual broke with Hoffa or testified against him or his associates.

Whether these beliefs are valid we do not know; if so, Hoffa's fear was justified, not paranoid, and grave civil liberties issues are raised. In any event, these beliefs were very real to Hoffa and his associates, and greatly influenced their behavior. Thus, secrets were whispered; confidential phone calls were placed to and from prearranged but frequently changed coin booths; trusted aides would fly long distances to relay top security messages in person. To give the FBI false clues, Hoffa lied about

* Hoffa's decision never to take the Fifth Amendment, and therefore never to refuse to answer a question, kept him continually exposed to perjury. Many observers felt he would inevitably make an inadvertent mistake and be indicted on these grounds. But this did not happen.

his strategies over the phone and left misleading memos in his office. Personal loyalty became the paramount consideration, surpassing competence, when choosing his staff. And even his closest lieutenants could not be fully trusted; this partially accounted for his fierce temper outbursts and his refusal to delegate authority.

Hoffa's fear of Kennedy also helps explain his reluctance to move against "corrupt" but loyal union officials, and his frequent companionship with men whom Kennedy most strongly censured. Such an individual is Frank Matula who announced to the 1961 Convention, "I am against anybody criticizing the General President of this organization . . . there is only one guy who can help you when you are in trouble; I know because I am one of the guys whom he has helped and for which I will be forever grateful." [5] Similarly, Hoffa defended Abe Gordon against allegations concerning misuse of union pension funds, insisting that, "Everybody has the right to make one mistake." Gordon has stuck by Hoffa ever since.

Hoffa feels that people like Matula and Gordon are more reliable friends than some of his more "respectable" trade union associates. "One thing is for sure," he would say. "Gordon and Matula are not working for Bobby Kennedy. They are probably toward the top of Kennedy's 'drop dead list.' "

But, he would note, the Justice Department might induce some individuals on Kennedy's "drop dead list" to turn against him by offering to clear them in return. So with finality he would spit, "I don't trust anybody; everyone has his price."

HOW TO GET AHEAD IN THE WORLD

To Hoffa, life is a multi-dimensional chess game, which he plays on many levels at once with gusto and self-confidence. The problem is how to keep the opponent's capital pieces in jeopardy while persistently attacking his weaker fronts, a maneuver which requires a keen instinct for the realities of power. A sportsman's satisfaction is felt when the game is won, and unsportsmanlike disappointment expressed when lost. The rules of the game

are no holds barred—on this he and Robert Kennedy agree. And both have a fierce determination to triumph.

Hoffa frequently lectures on his personal equation for "winning the game of success," or, "how to get ahead in the world." The four key variables are: (1) know how to entertain; (2) honor your word; (3) know what you are doing; and (4) have powerful friends. Interestingly, he does not include in this list the drive and hard work which are among his chief assets.

"Know how to entertain," he says. "If you do things up right [as he did, for example, at his daughter's wedding, which cost about $20,000], people will know you *are* somebody and will treat you accordingly." Closely related is his belief that, "Once you determine in your mind to do something, do it thoroughly; make sure every detail is properly handled, or else don't bother to do it at all."

"Honoring his word" is a quality for which Hoffa is well known among employers, trade unionists, and reputedly among underworld elements. In a context where informal deals are frequently made, an atmosphere of trust is essential. Many employers value their working relationship with Hoffa for, although he is a hard bargainer, once a solution is reached they can depend on him to keep his end of the agreement, and see to it that their workers do likewise.

The "know what you are doing" dictum is the raison d'etre for Hoffa's emphasis upon self-discipline and mental vigilance. He feels that each mind has two sides, that the rational part must be fully developed, geared to the job at hand, and completely in control of the emotional element. Long ago, Hoffa deduced and has lived by the motto: "If you're not on top of your job, somebody else will be on top of you."

"But these three rules aren't worth a damn if you don't have powerful friends." Hoffa maintains that ambition without influential allies is foolhardy; he cites case after case of acquaintances from his past who were displaced because they did not know the right person at the right time. As a result, he has assiduously searched for and learned to operate with the sources of power, regardless of their role and reputation in society. Just as he

wants to possess a deputy sheriff's badge for Detroit's Wayne County, which he proudly carries in his billfold, so also he wants to be on friendly terms with other, less respectable groups. "You can't choose your associates," Hoffa will say. "You associate with whomever you need to make you a winner."

Hoffa came out of a fierce competitive environment, which he did not think he would survive. I have twice heard him regretfully explain that had he not expected a violent early death, he would gladly have acceded to his wife's desire for a larger family. He believed years ago, as he believes today, that underworld forces lie just beneath the surface in most American cities, uncontrolled by the ineffective and/or cooperative police. He is fond of stating that a professional killer can be hired "just like that" (with snap of fingers) for a mere $2000. Two heavy locks bolt his apartment door and revolvers are scattered within convenient reach.

In confidential moments, Hoffa proudly describes his deals with gangster elements. For example, Harold Gibbons and the municipal police appeared helpless during 1950-1951 when hoodlums were trying to move in on St. Louis Teamster locals. In response to an urgent appeal from Gibbons, whom he had never before met, Hoffa sent a henchman to guard Gibbons and flew down to negotiate with the head of the East St. Louis underworld. He hammered out one of his typical non-crusading agreements—"You leave us alone, and we'll leave you alone. If you get in trouble with the police, we'll help you out, and if we get in trouble you help us out, but stay away from our organization." It took a week of bargaining, during which Hoffa, for safety, kept within fighting distance of his armed opponent. The Detroit underworld passed the word along that Hoffa was dependable, and Gibbons never had any more trouble. This type of deal may seem reprehensible, but it did provide the essential foundation on which Gibbons built his showplace Local 688, often referred to as a model of social welfare and democratic unionism.

Hoffa is critical of Tobin's inability to grasp the necessity

for working arrangements with the underworld. He ridicules Tobin for attempting to keep gangsters out of the Teamsters by writing frantic letters or "by putting an iron gate around his office and thinking that would be enough." He explains, "That might have worked at International headquarters, but not in the field." *

Hoffa's current alliances include a strange collection of bedfellows—politicians and political fixers, gamblers, muscle-men, Negro leaders, financiers, truckers, priests and bishops, racketeers, and of course trade unionists. These have been valuable to him in a wide variety of ways: rendering discreet help in enforcing secondary boycotts, maintaining internal union discipline, and defending the Teamsters from Kennedy's aggressive onslaught, both legally and on the public relations front. Through union diplomacy, Pension Fund loans, and other means, he continues to "make powerful friends," though whether they are truly loyal and capable of pulling him out of his present and future difficulties is questionable.

HOFFA'S CONCEPT OF RIGHT AND WRONG

Hoffa rejects the two institutionalized systems of right and wrong in our society—law and religion. Yet, he feels his conduct is governed by a high personalized sense of ethics.

Hoffa's religious beliefs are non-existent, much to his wife's chagrin.** Indeed, he views organized religion much the way a Marxist does—as an opiate of the people. More significantly, he perceives different church groups as major sources of influence to manipulate. He claims that he can call on a large sector of Negro Protestant leaders for their support. He even schemed to

* Actually, Tobin did not try very hard to deal with racketeering in the union. Tobin's iron gate was the object of much controversy. *Fortune* magazine claimed in 1941 that its purpose was "to keep out the members," not the gangsters!

** However, he is intrigued by Judaism and particularly the Passover Seder. To Hoffa, this celebration of the Exodus from slavery exemplifies the historical capacity of people to push ahead in the face of adversity—a quality (and need) which he respects and identifies with.

use French Canadian bishops to induce the Vatican to relieve the pressures imposed upon him by certain American Catholics.

Similarly, to Hoffa law is not something to respect, but rather a set of principles designed to perpetuate those already in power, and something for others to "get around." Thus, Hoffa feels clear of conscience about his expertise in devising legal loopholes and practicing legal brinksmanship.

Hoffa's personal morality is pragmatic. Behavior which, in his opinion, improves his performance is sanctioned, and that which is likely to impair his effectiveness is prohibited: thus, his no sexual promiscuity, no alcohol, no tobacco rule. Loyalty to family and close friends is also part of this code, as is his reputation for honoring his word. In contrast, he is a master of deceit and subterfuge before reaching an agreement, when he finds this helpful in imposing his will on others.

Hoffa rationalizes his "anything goes" philosophy on grounds that "life is a jungle" where one must constantly fight to survive. People who think primarily in terms of right and wrong are "naïve"—Hoffa's favorite characterization of those with an approach to life different from his own.

4

Prelude to Power: Early Days in Detroit

James Riddle Hoffa was born on Valentine's Day, 1913, in a small midwestern town, Brazil, Indiana. His father, a coal driller of German-Dutch descent, died seven years later of coal poisoning leaving a wife, two sons, and two daughters.

Hoffa's mother, a strong-willed Irish woman, first moved the family to nearby Clinton, Indiana, where she took in washing to earn their living. Young Jimmy helped after school by running errands and stringing clam lines in the river. In 1925, Mrs. Hoffa found a manufacturing job and settled down with her children on Detroit's West Side. Jimmy quit school at the end of the seventh grade and sought regular work.

Hoffa's trade union career began in the early years of the Depression. At eighteen, he was working in a warehouse of Kroeger's, a large midwestern food chain, unloading produce cars. He recalls today the long hours and low pay which finally led the men to organize. "We would report in at 4:30 P.M. and stay around as long as they wanted us to. When a boxcar came in they would call a few of us to unload. The rest of the night we sat around gabbing and trying to keep warm. For that we got paid 32 cents an hour—but only for the time we actually worked."

Discontent was rampant among the workers, and their dissatisfactions were mobilized by Hoffa and his buddies, four

of whom later rose with him through the Teamster ranks in Detroit. One night, as a truck filled with strawberries pulled into the warehouse, Hoffa urged the men to refuse to work until management promised higher pay and better working conditions. Anxious to unload their perishable shipment, management capitulated within an hour, and Hoffa had won his first "collective bargaining" contract. Shortly afterwards the group received a charter from the AFL, and in 1932 affiliated with the Teamsters. Hoffa had unpacked his last box of strawberries, and became a full-time union official.

HOFFA'S DOMINANCE OF DETROIT

Teamster organization in Detroit was weak during the early depression years. Locals were small, debt-ridden, and split by dissension. Hoffa first took his group into Local 674, which was near dissolution because of a costly and unsuccessful strike. The following year he merged with Local 299 (General Truck Drivers), which had been chartered in April, 1933, and by December had approximately 400 members in good standing and less than $400 in its treasury.

At this point Hoffa met Owen Bert Brennan, a Teamster official who in 1938 became president of Local 337 (Food and Beverage Drivers), formed as a result of organizing campaigns led by Local 299. The Hoffa-Brennan friendship was to last almost three decades, until Brennan's death from cancer in June, 1961; during which time they were partners in both trade union activities and personal financial affairs.

On January 8, 1936, Local 299 was placed under trusteeship (or receivership) by Teamster President Dan Tobin, due to financial impropriety and questionable election procedures.*

* The power to put locals into trusteeship, with a representative of the International appointed to administer local affairs, is one which most presidents of national unions possess. In some cases the trustee actually runs the local; in others he may delegate this responsibility to subordinates or permit a high degree of self-rule, while retaining the ultimate authority himself. Used ostensibly in situations where the local leadership is corrupt or incompetent, this right to forestall self-government is obviously subject to severe abuse by International officers who wish to subjugate rebellious locals permanently, milk them financially, or simply concentrate power in their own hands. For example, John L. Lewis had more than half of the United Mine Workers under direct trusteeship for many years. The courts generally frowned on such long tenure regardless of the ability and expressed intentions of the trustee, and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act requires explicit justification for trusteeships lasting longer than eighteen months.

John English, an International auditor who is now International secretary-treasurer, was sent in by Tobin to inspect the local's books. He noted on his audit sheet: "This local ran business very loose. Business agents collected dues never turned in, everybody handled [membership] stamps until R. J. Bennett was appointed receiver. . . . I have called the credit off. . . . Books in bad shape up to January 1, 1936." Ray Bennett, trustee of many Detroit locals, including 299, and General Organizer for the International, later recalled:

> Local 299 was supposedly the largest organization in the city of Detroit and conditions were so bad that they owed everyone money—the membership and officers of that organization were the cause of continuous turmoil as far as the Joint Council was concerned. The final climax was that the officers who were last in office, in order to be assured of their election, got the Longshoremen to transfer into the organization and vote for their officers. The International then took over and placed the organization under a Receiver.[1]

During the war additional sources of disruption stemmed from the clash with the CIO and accusations against 299 of racial discrimination. Thus, except for a short break in 1942, the trusteeship continued in force from 1936 until 1945, when the local had more than 5000 members and well over $50,000 in assets.

It is not clear whether the trusteeship was initially designed to help Hoffa or hinder him. Its ultimate effect, however, was to keep him in power. At the start of the trusteeship, Hoffa's position was precarious; by the end he was in complete control.

Hoffa is inclined to exaggerate his status in the 1930's, incorrectly claiming that he dominated trucking throughout Michigan and other Central States, as well as in Detroit. He asserts and

official Teamster publications today affirm that he was elected president of 299 in 1937. Hoffa further maintains that he controlled trustee Bennett, rather than vice versa. Actually, all this seems highly unlikely. Writing in 1942, Ray Bennett indicated that he had continually considered it unwise to hold elections for officers in Local 299, for, "If there were to be an election, the organization would absolutely get out of control." [2] Thus, Hoffa was probably not elected president in the late thirties or early forties.

Bennett did, though, permit substantial self-rule. Local 299 was (and is) divided into three divisions: local cartage, over-the-road, and auto haulers, each administered by an elected twelve-man board which chose the full-time business agents from among its members. Despite sporadic opposition, Hoffa was a board member, business agent, and informal leader of Local 299 from about 1937 on. But it was Bennett's authority as trustee which enabled Hoffa to govern the turbulent membership by avoiding elections and keeping potential troublemakers in constant fear of expulsion. For example, in 1940 a group of 44 disgruntled members called several wildcat strikes and demanded an election.* After a few meetings with the dissident leaders, Bennett concluded that their main objective was his eliminating Hoffa and cohorts and hiring them instead. Bennett reported to President Tobin that "Jimmy and Squires were doing a good job and I couldn't see any reason for firing them and they were going to stay on the job." ** The rebels then sought to dissolve the trusteeship and obtain an election by court order. But Bennett informed their attorney that he had no intention of paying their legal bills, and explained to Tobin in 1942, "Since that time I have not had a wildcat strike in Local 299." [3]

Bennett's support of Hoffa was partially due to his fear that the opposition would prove disloyal to the Teamsters and pro-CIO. In addition, Bennett knew that Hoffa was an effective leader with a large following. It was safer to protect the strong

* A wildcat strike is one called without the authority of the existing union leadership.

** Al Squires was one of Hoffa's closest lieutenants.

man in power than incur his anger and submit to the uncertainties inherent in an election.

The situation in many other Detroit locals was not much better in the prewar period. Although 299 was the first to be placed under trusteeship, others soon followed—Milk Drivers Local 155 in February, 1937; Van Drivers Local 243 in March, 1937; and Pontiac's General Drivers Local 614 in November, 1940.[4] In additional cases the trustee was compelled to return charters to the International because of inadequate membership and disciplinary problems.

With so many Detroit locals in trusteeship, Hoffa was gradually able to dominate the city's Teamster movement; he became well known as "the man to call on if you want to get things done in Detroit." Formally, this preëminence was not recognized until after the war. In 1945, when the trusteeship was finally revoked, Hoffa was elected president of 299 (a position he still holds today), and in 1947 he became president of Detroit's Joint Council 43, carrying a slate of friends into office with him. But these titles merely constituted formal recognition of the informal powers which Hoffa had been exercising for several years.

ONWARD THROUGH MICHIGAN—THE WAR PERIOD

By the Second World War, already controlling the largest Teamster local in Michigan's largest city, Hoffa was anxious to spread his domain over the rest of the state. In 1942 Joint Council 43 began publishing *The Michigan Teamster,* an information-propaganda organ for state-wide distribution. At about the same time Hoffa organized and became the first chairman of the Michigan Conference of Teamsters, a loose federation of locals.

Hoffa's grand scheme was to unionize the small outlying towns in Michigan and obtain a single state-wide contract, which he would negotiate, for all local cartage, in place of the many independently bargained agreements which then existed. In February, 1942, he wrote Tom Flynn, Tobin's administrative assistant, "I would like to have you inform the local unions involved to negotiate a state-wide contract rather than individual contracts. The

cities that will be involved at this particular time are as follows: Flint, Pontiac, Lansing, Muskegon and Battle Creek." [5] And Flynn dutifully complied.

Within a year the contract was extended to several other Michigan cities, and in December Hoffa requested the International to:

> . . . instruct all local unions in the state of Michigan to appraise and submit to the International Union and Joint Council #43 all applications for these raises. We feel that we have more at stake than the smaller local unions outstate . . . what we are concerned about are other local unions within the state of Michigan, doing the same type of work that our Detroit locals, are going to make applications [to the War Labor Board] for wage increases that are very liable and likely to upset all applications for raises filed by our locals within the state of Michigan. . . . It is our opinion that the International Union will have to take some such steps in every state in order to keep the small local union from using the large local union as an example, thereby nullifying the large local's chances of receiving an increase.[6] *

Hoffa's take-over of Michigan was not accomplished without opposition. Both employers and local unions resented their loss of autonomy, a phenomenon with which Hoffa was to become better acquainted as he extended his bargaining power. But, with assistance from Ray Bennett and the International, he forced through his plan. The employers were compelled to agree by a slowdown to 15 miles an hour (in place of a verboten wartime strike). Union resistance was particularly keen in Grand Rapids, Jackson, and Kalamazoo. The following report from Bennett to Tobin on a meeting of Kalamazoo rank and filers in December, 1942, illustrates both the antagonism toward Hoffa and the tactics used to override it:

* Since the war, Hoffa has adopted a point of view diametrically opposed to that expressed in his last sentence. In many instances he has favored substantial gains for weaker locals as a partial substitute for potentially generous raises which the stronger ones forego, all in the interest of uniformity. This change of attitude may be due to political expediency, increased skill and experience, or simply to the fact that different techniques are dictated by the return to free collective bargaining and the expiration of wartime government agencies.

> I spoke about it first, then finally Cripe and one of the other Business Agents told the reasons why they had objected to the State-Wide Contract—namely; that he claimed Jimmy Hoffa was a dictator; also that the State-Wide Contract was being controlled and handled out of Detroit; . . . after Cripe and the Business Agents got up and reminded the membership of all the so-called rotten deals that they have received, the membership decided and attemptd to pass a motion, that irrespective of how the State Committee, or our International, felt about it, they were going to put through their contract. Just as the chairman was going to put the motion to a vote, I rose to my feet and told the membership and officers, in no uncertain terms, that I was at this meeting at the instructions of the International, and it was my duty to advise them as to what might happen if they used such action, and if they valued their organization, they had better change their mind and their attitude then and there or there would not be any organization. A few of the more reasonable members soon grasped the meaning of this, and a motion was put on the floor that the question of the city contract be tabled. . . .[7]

AFTER THE WAR—CENTRAL STATES AND BEYOND

Even before his control over Michigan was consolidated, Hoffa was ambitiously plotting beyond its borders. In 1937, the Central States Drivers Council (CSDC) had been set up by Minneapolis Teamsters to organize and bargain centrally for all Midwestern over-the-road drivers, a group which was just beginning its rapid growth. Hoffa was quick to see the potential in this body, and threw the full support of Detroit behind the Council, which met with opposition from many independent-minded locals (Chap. 5).

In 1940, then only twenty-seven years old, Hoffa became negotiating chairman of the Council, and in 1941 vice-president as well, two positions he has held ever since. However, it was not until the postwar period, having sewn up Detroit and Michigan, that he began to dominate the CSDC. During the ensuing decade, Hoffa, who has never driven a truck, became the bargaining champion of the tough highway driver, and expanded his power throughout the Central and Southern States. In the late forties and early fifties his Detroit organizers were running strikes and

locals as far afield as St. Louis and Kansas City, and Hoffa supporters were moving to the fore in Illinois and Indiana. In 1953, his area-wide control was recognized when he became head of the new Central Conference of Teamsters, and by 1955 he was negotiating contracts for all Midwestern and Southern over-the-road and local cartage drivers. This accomplished, his more recent attention has been directed toward the East and West, culminating in the 1964 national truck freight agreement.

Much of Hoffa's rise to power occurred before he held any International office of consequence. In 1943 he was appointed one of three trustees who examine the International's books annually. Between 1948 and 1950, he claims, Tobin offered to name him a General Organizer. However, Hoffa feared the loss of his freedom; he wanted to do his own bidding, not Tobin's. During the same period, hundreds of telegrams and letters from throughout the Central States urged Tobin to appoint him vice-president. But not until the next elections, at the 1952 Convention, did Hoffa become a vice-president, and at the behest of the delegates, not Tobin. Tobin described the youthful vice-president to the Convention:

> He is the biggest small man in Detroit. When you go to Detroit today you hear about Hoffa, but you do not hear a word about Henry Ford. As I said, he is a very big small man and he is one man we developed in our time. He is pretty nearly civilized now, but I knew him when he wasn't.[8]

In 1952 you heard about Hoffa in Detroit and throughout the Central and Southern States, but very little in other parts of the country. He may have possessed enough votes to become International president even then, but this he did not try until his reputation, both for good and ill, was much more widespread and firmly established, in October, 1957.

HOW HOFFA RAN HIS LOCAL

Fist fights, picket-line brawls, and internecine interunion squabbles were standard operating procedure in Detroit in the

1930's. Hoffa had a core of tough, intensely loyal lieutenants about him; together they shared hardships, and issued numerous whippings to employer representatives and CIO organizers alike.

His followers stayed with him for many years, with several of them serving as his top lieutenants in Detroit to this day. "You don't have to be the smartest," he is fond of saying. "If you're loyal and do your work well, I'll push you up the line." And that he has done.*

Hoffa ran his local in much the same way a competent old-time sheriff kept law and order with his half a dozen deputies. The job is done well, but not by formal rules. The sheriff's mind is a storehouse of knowledge about the power centers in his town; he knows when to use them and how to steer around them if necessary. These are not secrets to be shared with even the most trusted lieutenant. He does not call his entourage in for "policy discussions"; the deputies are not asked their opinions on appropriate action. Instead, their chief thinks things through as best he can and then acts with determination—albeit sometimes crudely. His lieutenants are given precise orders, and, when the need is great, they are all assigned overlapping tasks. Often they do not comprehend why they are performing certain functions; wasted time and effort may be commonplace, but they know it is important that they do precisely what they are told. They depend upon their chief for status and reward, and he relies upon them for information and action. This system worked well in Detroit in the 1930's and 1940's; unfortunately it may not be as appropriate to the broader stage onto which Hoffa

* Recent leaders of Local 299 who were associates in this early era include (besides President Hoffa): Vice-President Frank Fitzsimmons, Secretary-Treasurer Roland McMasters, former Secretary-Treasurer (until 1960) Frank Collins, Recording Secretary Dave Johnson, Trustees George Roxburgh and Sam Calhoun, and former Trustee (until his death in 1960) Al Squires. Officers of 299's large sister Local 337 since the late thirties and early forties include: former President (until his death in 1961) Owen Bert Brennan, current President Robert Holmes, Vice-President James Clift, former Vice-President (until his death in 1960) James Langley, Secretary-Treasurer Walt Schuler, and Recording Secretary Morris Coleman. In fact, Collins, Calhoun, Holmes, and Langley date all the way back to that first strawberry strike at Kroeger's.

thrust himself in the 1950's and 1960's, but he seems unwilling or unable to adopt new procedures.

THE CLASH WITH THE CIO

An aggressive trade unionist, Hoffa was bound to clash with others of a similar nature—challengers from the CIO in the strongest CIO town in the country. Ray Bennett wrote in 1942:

> Local #155 [milk-drivers] is an organization in Detroit that has a dual organization set-up. At the present time, the CIO and the organization of ours have continuously been having fights among themselves. . . . The Van Drivers organization is . . . continuously having trouble with the CIO. . . . We found Stewards in that organization that have attempted to swing their own company, where they worked, into the CIO.[9]

Intermittent battles occurred with the Brewery Workers, Automobile Workers, and other CIO affiliates. But in the late thirties and early forties the feuding was particularly virulent between Local 299 and the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Employees (RWDSE), CIO. Hoffa provided the following historical account in 1946:

> In 1940 the Teamsters Union put on a drive to complete the organization of all food warehousing and delivering in Detroit. We were successful in organizing all warehouse, grocery, and all allied businesses making deliveries to retail stores. Along about this time the Retail, Wholesale Department Store Employees and Food Employees Union, affiliated with the CIO Clerks Union, headed by Wolcheck from New York, attempted to organize the retail stores in and around Detroit. We immediately at the same time requested a charter to be issued from the International Retail Clerks Protection Association, A. F. of L., to organize the same type of clerks and personnel, so that we would not wake up some morning and find out that the clerks, being CIO would be in a position to refuse delivery by an A. F. of L. driver. . . . The CIO Retail Clerks Union headed by the CIO representative Wolcheck for the past ten years have used as a spearhead an attempt of raiding Teamsters all over the state of Michigan. So far we have been successful in repelling all of the raiding tactics and expect to do so in the future.[10]

He then went on to explain how "the two organizations [had] clashed in a jurisdictional fight which shut down the entire city of Pontiac retail stores for a period of two days. The CIO Clerks Union being assisted in their organizing by the United Automobile Workers, CIO." In the end, because of the resulting delay and confusion, "both Unions lost out." [11]

As a result of such conflicts and mutual failures, peace pacts were periodically signed, only to be broken shortly afterwards. Street battles were rife; the RWDSE hired protection, but the Teamsters were able to supply their own muscle, and Hoffa himself gave more than one vicious beating to rival leaders. He even led an attack on the RWDSE's Detroit headquarters.

On occasion, strategy dictated that Teamsters should drive through a RWDSE picket line, breaking with a most important trade union tradition, and drive they did, led by Hoffa. In one instance in 1941, Teamsters were instructed to drive through a CIO picket line around Sears, and when several refused, their ringleaders were expelled and lost their jobs.

In a particularly bitter case, four members of Local 337 asked their employer (Dossin Food Products–Pepsi-Cola) to cease withholding their monthly union dues and to reopen the wage scale, in violation of the contract. The employer refused and notified the local, which promptly expelled the four as "disloyal," causing them to be fired under the closed-shop agreement. The four men then affiliated with the RWDSE and encouraged the other drivers to strike in sympathy, successfully tying up many trucks. They secured the cooperation of several UAW auto plants which refused to accept Teamster-delivered shipments of Pepsi-Cola. Informing his vice-presidents of these events, and asking for permission to expend International funds in 337's battle against the CIO, President Tobin related:

> The Joint Council of Detroit immediately took up this fight against our union and our employers and decided to protect the employer and they, therefore, manned the trucks with drivers from other unions

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HOFFA

and the TEAMSTERS

A STUDY OF UNION POWER

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

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To our daughter
Deborah

Chapter 2

FROM TOBIN TO BECK

FROM 1907 TO 1952, the Teamsters Union grew under Tobin's direction. Tobin did not control the economic policies pursued by locals in the union, but he exercised a dominant influence over those decisions which affected the relationship of the IBT to the other parts of the labor movement and he served as spokesman for an important segment of the labor force. It was not until the late 1930's that Dave Beck emerged to challenge the power of Tobin.

Tobin Takes Over

The rise of Tobin had been gradual. Many of the details of his early life have not been well established. He was born in Ireland in 1875, thirty miles from the mouth of the River Shannon, the son of John and Bridget (Kennelly) Tobin.[1] In 1889 he traveled alone to the United States. Although Tobin had received some elementary education in Ireland, he continued his formal schooling at night in Cambridge and Boston, Massachusetts. He also studied independently at home.

Tobin worked at odd jobs before obtaining employment in a Cambridge sheet metal plant. He lost his position in the panic of 1893. Subsequently, he worked around horses and stables for a time. During part of the period, when he drove a three-horse truck, his earnings were $11.00 for 66 hours of work.[2] In 1895 and 1896, he drove a street car in Boston, and in the latter year joined the Knights of Labor.

At this time, Tobin began raising a family. His first marriage to Annie E. Reagan, who bore him five sons and a daughter, ended by her death. Tobin's second marriage was with Irene Halloran. Several of his children have been active in labor circles either with the teamsters or in other areas of the labor movement.

Tobin then became a driver-salesman. He bought a horse and wagon and sold butter, eggs, cheese, tea, coffee, and cocoa. He also hauled coal. Later, Tobin expanded operations. He gained ownership of a team of horses and was hired to sprinkle the streets with water and to drive for a meat market.

Tobin's early background shows considerable diversification of work entwined with much financial hardship. Sometime in the year 1900 Tobin joined the local of the Team Drivers International Union in Boston. Shortly thereafter he became a member of the newly formed Boston Local 25 and was chosen a delegate to the Niagara Falls convention of 1903. It was at that meeting that the IBT was organized. Tobin said:

> When I returned I was discharged for being an agitator and found it difficult to find employment. I did find employment at $12 a week, working 12 hours a day . . .[3]

In December, 1903, Tobin ran for business agent of his local union, but was defeated. It was the only defeat he ever suffered as a candidate for any office in the labor movement. The following year, however, he was elected to the office of business agent and his career as a union leader began. In 1906, it was an alert and rather vociferous Tobin who proposed to the convention of the IBT that Boston be the site for the 1907 meeting. His motion passed and when the meeting opened in August, 1907, Daniel J. Tobin, who had become president of the Teamsters and Chauffeurs District Joint Council 10 of Boston, was the temporary presiding officer of the convention.

John M. Gillespie, also a business agent in Local 25, served as Tobin's campaign manager. Their relationship, which had begun a short time earlier, developed into a lifelong friendship.

It was Gillespie who nominated Tobin for the presidency of the international union. Immediately upon his election Tobin appointed Gillespie, his junior by five years, international organizer for the New England district. In 1925, Gillespie was brought to Indianapolis by Tobin to take over the duties of assistant to the president. Subsequently, whenever Tobin went on vacation, he turned over the presidential duties and powers to his assistant, in whose personal loyalty he had complete faith and confidence. On the death of Thomas L. Hughes in 1941, Gillespie was appointed secretary-treasurer of the IBT. Gillespie, Tobin's most trusted associate in the union, died early in 1946.

As has been indicated, upon assuming the presidency, Tobin was confronted by a number of serious problems and disagreements. But his task was made even more difficult because of the cleavage in his own executive board. Four of the vice presidents joined themselves into an opposing force and voted as a unit on most issues. Their vote was only barely met by the combined forces of the other three vice presidents and the secretary-treasurer. On many occasions, Tobin broke a four-four tie by casting the decisive ballot. For several years, he maintained control of the organization by this slim margin. In December, 1908, the joint council of the Teamsters Union in New York brought Tobin up on charges before the international executive board, claiming that he had been elected illegally by the 1908 convention. It argued that Local 25 had not been in good standing at the time and Tobin had thus been ineligible for office. By a split vote, the board threw out the charges.

The disruptive and undermining tactics carried on by Tobin's opposition on the board included acts of fostering and encouraging secession movements. Some of these members while serving as officers of the IBT and on its payroll were simultaneously organizing independent unions of teamsters. At the convention of 1910, Tobin finally succeeded in dislodging the last vestiges of his opposition. For the next thirty years he remained almost completely unrestricted and unchallenged in running the affairs

of the international office. But during the first decade of the existence of the union, when internecine warfare had been at its height, in several cases, officers of the IBT had obtained court injunctions restraining expelled or recalcitrant locals in various ways.[4]

Although fortune smiled upon him on many occasions and in different ways, Tobin's success in building the union was basically the result of his rather rigid adherence to two policies he set for himself—avoidance, in general, of sympathy action on behalf of other unions in distress and careful and frugal expenditure of union funds. In 1907, Tobin was head of a relatively small union and he knew the danger of dissipating its energies and repeating the kinds of actions which had weakened it in the past. As a result, despite the close contact between teamsters and many other groups of workers, the IBT has on the whole, but particularly between 1907 and the early 1930's, steered clear of sympathy strikes, boycotts, and economic struggles undertaken by other trade unions. Even more important, however—Tobin was exceedingly zealous in guarding the union treasury. All conditions surrounding strikes and lockouts were carefully examined before any benefits were paid out by the international to its locals. Compliance with numerous rules and constitutional provisions was required before strike approval was granted by the international executive board. Tobin also sought to increase the supply of funds and throughout his incumbency as president, he fought for higher per capita taxes from the local. It was with much pride that he later used to recount that the Teamsters Union was one of the very few large labor organizations that never lost any money in bank failures or economic depressions.[5]

It is an interesting commentary on Tobin's career to indicate some of the views he expressed to the 1906 convention of the IBT, the year prior to his election as international president. At that time, he opposed increasing the per capita tax of 15 cents[6] and he was against proposals to set up a death benefit program to be run by the international union. On the other hand, he

favored higher salaries for union officers (a stand opposed to that taken by Shea). Comparing the Shea administration with that of other unions, Tobin said: "None of these organizations have better officers than we have." [7] His comments about Shea in subsequent years were less flattering.

The most disturbing factors in the first decade of Tobin's administration were the internecine strife within the union, the schismatic behavior of many locals, the secession movements conducted by various men and groups, and the existence of dualism, that is, rival and competing unions, in many parts of the country. Most of these difficulties occurred in Chicago and New York, cities in which other international unions met similar problems. But teamsters on the whole have been relatively refractory workers and have displayed a rugged and individualistic bent, so that the conduct of the locals is not too strange. More than half a century ago they were criticized by one of their leaders for conducting union business in saloons and on the curbstone instead of in the meeting hall.[8]

Sharp disagreement within the 1906 convention of the IBT led to the formation of the United Teamsters of America that year. Although it drew about 10,000 men away from the IBT, primarily in Chicago, New York City, and St. Louis, its strength was further augmented by the affiliation of locals which previously had been independent. Tobin worked hard to reabsorb this group into the IBT and was successful in effecting a compromise at the end of 1908 under which most of the locals that had left decided to return. The main defection continued in Chicago where a considerable number of unions remained independent.

The reabsorption of those New York locals formerly in the UTA and the designation of one of their leaders as a vice president of the IBT led to the secession of a second group of locals and the establishment of a sizable independent movement of teamsters around New York City. By 1911, almost all of the second group of seceding locals had returned to the IBT.

President Harry S. Truman and Vice President Alben W. Barkley attending the Gompers centennial celebration in 1950. From left to right: Barkley, Mrs. Barkley, William Green, George M. Harrison, Truman, Daniel J. Tobin, George Meany, Dean Acheson

President Franklin D. Roosevelt opening his 1944 campaign for reelection at a national conference of the Teamsters Union in Washington, D.C. From left to right: Henry J. Kaiser, William Green, Roosevelt, and Daniel J. Tobin

In the interim, however, on January 10, 1909, while attending a union meeting in New York City to work out a settlement of the conflict, Tobin was savagely attacked and severely beaten. In describing the assault, Tobin wrote that he was first struck over the head with a chair by one of the local business agents. The attack shattered his spectacles, injured his ribs, and led to a compound fracture of his nose. During the period of his hospitalization, blood poisoning set in, and for a time he hovered on the brink of death.[9]

Advances were made slowly by the teamsters in the second decade of the twentieth century. Membership grew at a low rate. In 1912, New York City had 9,000 organized teamsters and Chicago had 21,000.[10] The typical agreement in New York City in 1913 provided a weekly wage of $15.00 on one-horse trucks, $17.00 on two-horse trucks, $19.00 of three-horse trucks, and $21.00 on four-horse trucks, for 10 hours of work on each of 6 days; remuneration for holidays with double time rates in effect if work is performed on those days; and overtime at the rate of 30 cents per hour up to 9 P.M. and 45 cents per hour thereafter.[11] The scale represented an increase of $1.00 a week over that prevailing in 1909.[12]

AVERAGE MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS[13] (1903-1928)

Year	*Members*	*Year*	*Members*
1903	32,000	1916	63,024
1904	56,241	1917	70,599
1905	46,164	1918	74,359
1906	37,525	1919	98,225
1907	38,905	1920	112,453
1908	35,229	1921	83,474
1909	32,120	1922	69,839
1910	36,643	1923	73,430
1911	38,979	1924	75,805
1912	42,159	1925	78,969
1913	48,910	1926	83,660
1914	52,106	1927	88,707
1915	52,169	1928	91,646

In Chicago the independent movement continued to flourish and eventually a stalemate in the tug of war was achieved. Except with regard to control over drivers employed in general trucking operations, where a tacit status quo agreement was maintained between them, there was no overlap in the jurisdictional claims of the affiliated locals and the independent locals. This modus vivendi remained unaltered until the early 1930's when several public officials exerted pressure upon the independent locals to join the IBT. These governmental officers were alarmed by the extent of racketeering and gangster control in the teamsters unions in Chicago and they felt that a merger would introduce several checks upon the powers exercised by the local leaders.

Gradually, the situation in Chicago had become quite complicated. Not only were some of the important locals in the city independent but, between 1928 and 1935, hoodlums from the Capone gang had gained control over many locals of drivers. Some of the locals so dominated were affiliated with the IBT and others were independent. Under all these circumstances, violence was not uncommon. IBT vice president Patrick Berrell of Chicago was shot to death in 1932 by machine gun bullets in the struggle between organized labor and the gangsters. The following year Henry Burger, an international organizer operating in Chicago, was shot and seriously wounded.

It was only after the appointment of Daniel A. Gilbert as the chief investigator for the state's attorney's office in Cook County, Illinois, in 1932, that law and order once again became the basis under which the locals operated.

> Through a judicious mixture of false arrests, third-degree methods, and "spontaneous" invasions of the Capone unions' offices, Gilbert drove the Capone gang out of the independents and forced the local back into the unwilling arms of International Teamster President Dan Tobin.[14]

Gilbert had strong support and encouragement from Thomas J. Courtney, the state's attorney, and Mayor Edward J. Kelly of Chicago, who under pressure from the business interests and a public grown weary from the excesses of unionism undertook the drive to bring about teamster unity and end labor strife and racketeering. By 1934, many of the independent locals had joined the IBT. Courtney thereafter continued to assist the teamsters in their organizational efforts.[15] On various subsequent occasions, however, violent eruptions occurred in Chicago in which labor was involved.

In 1951, IBT officials in Chicago, many of whom obtained their jobs by replacing ousted Capone gangsters, were fearful that renewed hostilities were breaking out in the city. On January 18 of that year, William A. Lee, vice president of the IBT, publicly appealed to the mayor for police protection against intimidation by gangsters. Between June 1, 1950 and June 12, 1951, teamster officials in Chicago were subjected to two murders, three brutal assaults, and four bombings.

The IBT has never been able to gain complete control over workers employed as drivers either in Chicago or in several other places. The National War Labor Board pointed out that during the Second World War, the CIO organized and represented some trucking firms in certain cities—including New Orleans and Detroit.[16] Today, the IBT is faced with a number of pockets of dualism throughout the nation.

The Union Achieves Stability

Tobin was able to consolidate and build his power as president of the teamsters and become firmly entrenched in office after 1910 because no other member in the union gained national prominence until the rise of Dave Beck. Tobin studiously avoided irritating local leaders and except when circumstances were unusual or pressures upon him were strong to do so, refrained from intervening in local affairs. In 1908,

the convention gave him power to appoint trustees or receivers in those locals and joint councils were he found dishonest officials or special problems. This provision enabled Tobin to exert considerable influence in dealing with locals. Generally, however, there have been very few complaints that he abused the power to appoint trustees.

Tobin gradually succeeded in lengthening the presidential term of office by extending the time interval between conventions. Another reason for the change, however, was to reduce the expenditures of the international union. In 1908 the period was set at two years, in 1912 it was changed to three years, and finally in 1915 it was increased to five years. (Transportation restrictions during the Second World War necessitated a two-year postponement of the 1945 meeting. Since 1947 the five-year period has been put into effect again.) Tobin argued that frequent conventions were unnecessary. He pointed out that the granite cutters' union was a fine organization even though it had held only one convention in twenty-eight years.[17] Tobin widened his labor connections. In 1920, the IBT decided to affiliate with the Canadian Trades and Labor Congress; in 1928 with the building trades department of the AFL; and in 1948 with the International Transport Workers Federation.

Tobin was reelected unanimously each time he was a candidate for the office of general president, but he never had complete control of the convention. Many of his requests and recommendations to that body concerning financial matters were repeatedly turned down. Despite consistent and repeated pleading by Tobin, it was not until 1920 that the 15 cents monthly per capita was increased to 30 cents; and only in 1952 that it was raised to 40 cents. (In those same years strike benefits were increased from $5.00 to $10.00 and then $15.00 per week.) Tobin's pet scheme, which he continually urged upon the membership—to set up an international death benefit program under which the estate of each deceased member in good standing would receive a specified sum—was never approved by the convention. Clearly this plan would have considerably increased the power of the international over the locals because it would have given the IBT control of a fund in which the individual members had an equity.

An incident which illustrates Tobin's care when expending union funds occurred in January, 1929. The general executive board of the IBT considered a request made by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (AFL) for financial assistance. The garment workers were confronted by some serious organizational difficulties at that time. But the IBT reluctantly wrote the ILGWU that its board did not have the power to grant loans of any kind for any purpose—not even to one of its own locals.[18]

As the Teamsters Union grew and Tobin's prestige increased, he began to exercise his influence in various ways. In 1911, he was the representative of the AFL at the British Trades Union Congress, a post he held again in 1938 and 1942; and in 1918, he was a delegate to the International Federation of Trade Unions held at Amsterdam, Holland. Despite the opposition of Samuel Gompers, Tobin was elected treasurer of the AFL in 1917.[19] Gompers supported John B. Lennon, who had held the office of treasurer during the preceding twenty-eight years.

Tobin vigorously denied that his election as treasurer of the AFL in 1917, was a victory for a small group of labor leaders with pacifist leanings and a partial defeat for Gompers. He said:

> I have tried to carry out the wishes of President Gompers of the American Federation of Labor and of President Wilson of the United States. I want no misunderstanding as to my position. With thousands of men in our union, there has not been one strike. . . . We have been fighting an enemy from whom we may expect no mercy if he is victorious. We are trade unionists, but we are Americans first, and should be willing to make any sacrifice in this cause. I am human and have aspired for this office.[20]

As a member of the executive council of the AFL, Tobin became one of its most important and vociferous members. In 1921, when John L. Lewis was a candidate for the presidency of the AFL, Tobin served as Gompers' campaign manager.[21] But there were a number of disagreements within the executive council over matters of policy and Tobin threatened to resign several times. In each of these instances he was induced not to. Finally, in 1928 he resigned as treasurer as a result of a dispute within the executive council of the AFL on the question of whether to endorse Alfred E. Smith's candidacy for president of the United States. Tobin's main recommendation upon leaving the post—that the offices of secretary and of treasurer of the AFL be consolidated—was adopted in 1935.

Tobin was elected ninth vice president of the AFL in 1934, when the Federation increased the number of men in this office from eight to fifteen. Four years later, Tobin became a vice president of the building trades department of the AFL. In 1952, when William Green was thinking of retiring, Tobin indicated that he would like to be president of the AFL for several months and so end his long career in the labor movement. But he was unsuccessful in winning support.[22] At the time of his death in 1955, he had moved up to the position of third vice president.

As Tobin advanced in the hierarchy of the labor movement, his union was simultaneously gaining strength and growing in size. One of the most important single factors responsible for a revival of the AFL from 1933 on was the decision of the Teamsters Union to organize everything on wheels. It was during this period that the IBT became the most powerful union in the country. By threatening to stop deliveries to and from employers who refused to come to terms, the teamsters were able to gain contracts not only in trucking but in related industries. In many instances the support offered by the IBT to other unions engaged in picketing or in bargaining negotiations was decisive in bolstering the position of these unions and in winning

their objectives for them, but in other cases, when teamster support was not forthcoming, organizational drives collapsed. Unions organizing workers who are normally employed only singly or in small numbers in the typical establishment, as in retail trade or building service, were often dependent on the teamsters for assistance.

AVERAGE MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS[23] (1929-1956)

Year	*Members*	*Year*	*Members*
1929	97,632	1943	534,882
1930	86,209	1944	542,671
1931	89,937	1945	595,220
1932	77,637	1946	765,708
1933	75,206	1947	890,684
1934	112,216	1948	916,751
1935	146,035	1949	958,931
1936	172,204	1950	1,009,751
1937	277,717	1951	1,075,508
1938	360,694	1952	1,120,245
1939	417,761	1953	1,203,202
1940	456,589	1954	1,233,013
1941	544,247	1955	1,288,361
1942	586,218	1956	1,368,082

In the 1930's, Tobin's opinions on the path to be followed by the labor movement and the issue of craft versus industrial unionism as the primary basis of organization were given considerable weight by many other labor leaders. Even before the split in the AFL occurred, he was bitterly opposed to the industrial form of organization and deprecatingly critical of unskilled workers as sources of potential union membership. His position was clearly indicated at one stage of the proceedings of the 1934 convention of the American Federation of Labor. While engaged in what had become almost an annual exchange of recriminations on the convention floor with leaders of the brewery workers, Tobin said:

> We have to use force in our organizations. If we didn't use force and enforce the decisions, we would not have an international union of 135,000 members—and they are not the *rubbish* that have lately come into other organizations.[24]

Several of the delegates objected to the term which Tobin had used and demanded that he retract the expression. Tobin, however, was adamant. He refused to withdraw the statement and indicated that he had no doubt as to its validity. At that point, William Green had to call the convention to order.

When the division in the AFL began to take form in 1935, Tobin continued his opposition to the growth of industrial unions. He contended, for example, that it was not possible to organize the steelworkers. For many years, of course, Tobin had been fighting for the separation of teamsters from other workers. He was of the stalwart and dominant core of labor leaders which favored craft unionism and he explicitly maintained that industrial unionism would cause more hardship to the teamsters than to any other trade union.[25] Once the split between the AFL and CIO was completed, Tobin was one of the first labor leaders who strongly urged reunification. At the 1938 convention of the AFL, he vigorously supported a plea by President Roosevelt for unity in the labor movement despite the rather cool reception which the message received from the other union heads present.[26]

Tobin was among those labor leaders who, during the late 1930's, opposed amending the Wagner Act to make its provisions more palatable to the AFL. Although some supporters of the AFL charged that a majority of the members of the NLRB were biased in favor of the CIO, Tobin felt that any alterations in the law would bring about a wide series of changes desired by employers.[27] During his entire career in office he violently opposed the communists and in 1935, had them outlawed from the IBT. Tobin despised Harry Bridges of the

longshoremen's union, and he did not think too highly of John L. Lewis of the mine workers.[28]

During the 1940's relations between the two federations became stabilized but efforts to amalgamate them continued. For a number of years, beginning in 1942, Tobin served on several successive committees, made up of representatives from both organizations, that tried to effect a merger. According to Tobin, the attempts failed because of a handful of blind and ambitious leaders in the CIO and AFL.[29] In 1950, he again served on such a joint committee.

As Tobin's national influence increased, he also became enmeshed in national politics. In 1928, he fought unsuccessfully to have the executive council of the AFL endorse the candidacy of Smith for president. He maintained that such action would carry out labor's nonpartisan policy of rewarding its friends.[30] Tobin was among the first supporters of Franklin D. Roosevelt for the presidency in 1932, and, after the nomination, he was appointed chairman of the labor division of the national campaign committee of the Democratic party. During the first part of Roosevelt's administration, he longed to be named Secretary of Labor and was sorely disappointed when the position was not offered to him; he declined to accept the office of regional director of public works for the north central states. Roosevelt, on many occasions, went out of his way to flatter Tobin and in this manner mollified him sufficiently to keep him as labor chairman in the subsequent presidential campaigns of 1936, 1940, and 1944. Indeed, in a personal tribute to Tobin, Roosevelt opened his campaign for a fourth term in 1944 at the banquet meeting of a national conference of the IBT. In 1940, for a brief period, Tobin held a federal post as one of Roosevelt's administrative assistants.

In the early 1940's, Tobin was able to defeat a group of Trotskyite leaders, including the Dunne brothers—Vincent, Miles, and Grant—and Farrell Dobbs, who had held control of Minneapolis Local 574 during the 1930's and whose activities were

responsible at least in part for bringing about a fundamental change in the structure of the union. Beginning in 1933, the local undertook a deliberate campaign to enlarge its jurisdiction. In 1934, after winning a number of bitter strikes, conducted despite the opposition of Tobin, it began expanding beyond the confines of Minneapolis and organizing over-the-road drivers. The process was carried on by requiring all drivers coming into the Minneapolis terminals controlled by the local to be union members. Before long, it held a minor strategic position in the Midwest.

It was the leaders of this local who conceived the notion of setting up the District Drivers Council to coordinate the activities of teamster locals throughout the region and to bring workers other than drivers into the union. The work of the council led to a uniform contract for over-the-road drivers[31] in 1938.

Tobin, except for brief interludes, had been strongly critical of Local 574. Its leaders controlled the Socialist Workers party in the United States and, contrary to the labor movement, in general, which at the beginning of the 1940's was almost solidly behind the defense program of the federal government, held definite antiwar views. This attitude intensified the hostility and frictions between Tobin and Local 574. The local seemed disposed to leave the IBT and join the CIO. To forestall this eventuality, Tobin took over the administration of the local and, with the help of Beck, sent in hundreds of men from other cities. Such action was necessary because the rank-and-file workers of the local supported the ousted leaders.[32]

President Roosevelt revealed in mid-1941 that Tobin had charged the Socialist Workers party with domination of the Minneapolis local.[33] Roosevelt seemed to be interested in the situation and probably brought the federal government into the intraunion controversy in order to remove a potential trouble area and also to appease his long-time supporter, Dan Tobin. Twenty-nine members of the Socialist Workers party including fifteen leaders and members of the Minneapolis local were indicted in 1941

under the Sedition Act of 1861 and the Smith Act of 1940 for advocating sedition and the overthrow of the United States government for force and violence. Eighteen of them were convicted on the charge of conspiring to create insubordination in the armed forces. Successful prosecution by the government completely broke the opposition to Tobin in that region. Various civic groups felt that the decision was a violation of civil liberties. The United States Supreme Court, however, upheld the verdict of the lower courts.[34]

After the death of Roosevelt, Tobin was involved in a controversy with Frances Perkins. Perkins, who had been the Secretary of Labor between 1933 and 1945, stated that Roosevelt, Tobin, and she, had held a conference to consider John L. Lewis' request to be designated as the 1940 vice presidential candidate of the Democratic party. Tobin vehemently denied that any such conference ever took place.[35]

Tobin was never too friendly with Harry S. Truman. He turned down the office of Secretary of Labor, when apparently it was offered to him by Truman in 1948. At the same time, the union revealed that Tobin had refused a similar proffer by Roosevelt in the fall of 1943.[36] In 1952, he returned to the political arena and supported Adlai E. Stevenson, the Democratic nominee for president.

Tobin was opinionated and, being a prolific writer, publicly expressed himself on a large number of subjects. In 1904, the IBT had placed the editorship of its monthly journal in the hands of the general president. Tobin took full advantage of this opportunity to communicate his ideas. From 1907 until the very end of 1941, with the exception of a few months of vacation or illness, he wrote every editorial appearing in the magazine. This ordinarily involved eight or more pages of print a month. The remainder of the issue comprised mainly items of general interest in the form of correspondence and abstracts from other journals.

Tobin's attitude towards immigration was widely prevalent among union leaders. Throughout his life he fought for a strong alien exclusion policy. He felt that foreigners represented a threat to the standards achieved by wage earners in this country. He was pleased that the First World War had virtually brought immigration to a halt and he favored enactment of the literacy test requirements. On one occasion, during the Second World War, Tobin wrote: "We all love the Chinese," [37] but he added that they should be kept out of the United States. Furthermore, he sanctioned editorials in the union's journal which opposed the admission of refugees. Tobin had a complete lack of sympathy for the traditional American policy toward those persons of foreign origin seeking a new home in the United States. He stressed that 99 7/8 per cent of the members of the Teamsters Union were American citizens.

Despite the fact that Tobin was an immigrant himself, there are occasions in his writings when he showed deep bias on this and related subjects. In one instance, he criticized the *Jewish* leadership of the CIO for leaving the AFL.[38] In another, he permitted ridicule to be heaped on the brewery workers union because their officials had foreign sounding surnames.[39] On the other hand, he lavished praise on men not particularly favorably disposed toward immigrants, such as Father Charles E. Coughlin[40] and Senator Patrick A. McCarran;[41] and he called Westbrook Pegler (who, in 1940, had written: " . . . Mr. Tobin, the international president—himself no criminal, to be sure . . . ")[42] a most able and fearless writer.[43]

The relatively conservative attitude of Tobin is reflected in his notions concerning wages. In 1915 he wrote: " . . . it is impossible for unions to go on year after year endeavoring or expecting to obtain an increase in wages and shortening of working hours" since many workers are getting " . . . as much as the industry can afford to pay." [44] He subsequently adhered to this position when he had to take part in the bargaining negotiations of some IBT locals. Tobin favored low initiation

fees to make the union more readily accessible to those desiring to join and he opposed work permits, that is, cards which allow nonunion members to be employed temporarily by a firm, when used by locals as a device for withholding full privileges from those working as teamsters.

Tobin never overlooked an opportunity to consolidate or increase his power nor did he readily tolerate any opposition he could suppress. On one occasion, a local which criticized him had its charter revoked.[45] Through perseverance, he gradually succeeded in getting authority to determine jointly with the secretary-treasurer and without the need for prior or subsequent approval by the general executive board the amount, when no more than a thousand dollars, to be contributed by the union to worthy causes. By 1942 it was within his discretion to decide what matters to delete in publishing the minutes of the general executive board in the monthly journal. One author contended that in the 1940's Tobin made continual efforts to be relieved from some of his work without being relieved from any authority.[46]

In his later years, when the IBT was firmly established financially, Tobin was treated generously. At the time of his first election to the presidency, he received a salary of $1,800 a year and an allowance of $2.00 a day for hotel expenses when on the road. His remuneration was augmented gradually and by 1940 he was getting $30,000 a year. The 1947 convention tried hard to raise his pay again, but Tobin vehemently refused any increase. He threatened not to run for general president if the convention overruled him on this matter and the delegates reluctantly acquiesced to his wishes. Tobin said: "You pay me enough. I don't need any more." [47] The union, however, supplemented his salary with all business expenses, vacation costs incurred in the United States or abroad, a lavish house purchased for him in 1943 in Miami Beach, Florida, in which he resided each winter, and another home built for him in 1946 at the summer resort of Marshfield, Massachusetts. Title to the houses

was held by the union. Upon Tobin's retirement in 1952, when he was designated general president emeritus, his allowances increased. This occurred because a provision of the IBT constitution entitled Tobin to an amount equal to that paid to the general president and the 1952 convention of the IBT raised the salary of its chief officer to $50,000. Other perquisites which Tobin received subsequent to his retirement included a Cadillac limousine, the services of a combination chauffeur-handyman, the services of a full-time maid, and all expenses incidental to the maintenance of his two houses.[48]

Tobin voiced many strong opinions, even on matters not directly concerning the labor movement. On occasion, the teamster president criticized the practical soundness of college professors. During the prohibition era, he maintained that the use of "bootleg" whiskey or "hootch" was making "madmen" and "Jakey-hounds" out of normal human beings. He was highly displeased with the growing importance of jazz and with the increase in "loose-living" among the youth of the country. In 1919, the general executive board revoked the charter and expelled the officers of a Minneapolis local for running a whiskey-selling club, then popularly known as a "blind tiger" or whiskey shop.[49]

By the beginning of 1940, after thirty years of relative quiescence, the pressures within the union for major changes in the administrative machinery began to mount again as a result of the rise of a new generation of local leaders who were more dynamic and aggressive than many of the older men still holding power, the vast changes in industrial processes and organization affecting the IBT, and the significant modification in the structure and jurisdiction of the union. Among these new leaders were Dave Beck who had firmly established his hegemony over the entire West Coast region and James R. Hoffa who was emerging as a power in the Detroit area. The development of the union and the fortunes of Daniel Tobin were vitally affected by the transition in which the locus of power and the dominant sectors of teamster activity moved from local cartage hauling and the work of salesmen-drivers to over-the-road operations and warehousing.

The Rise of Dave Beck

David D. Beck was born in Stockton, California on June 16, 1894 to Lemuel and Mary (Tierney) Beck. His father, a carpet cleaner who had migrated from Tennessee, was barely able to make ends meet. When Dave was four, the family moved to Seattle.

Dave Beck, who was educated in the public schools of Seattle, completed only three years of high school; but he later took a variety of extension courses in liberal arts subjects for a number of years at the University of Washington. At seven, he sold newspapers on the streets of Seattle. He left school at the age of sixteen to begin work in the laundry where his mother was employed. At first he held a job inside the plant but later he became a truck driver. In 1914, he joined the union. During the First World War Beck served in the United States Navy air corps as an aerial gunner. In 1918, he married Dorothy E. Leschander; they have one son.

After his discharge from the armed forces, he returned to Seattle and resumed driving a laundry truck—a job he held until 1926. Simultaneously he became immersed in union activity. In 1923, he became president of Joint Council 28, embracing all locals in the state of Washington. In 1924, he took office as secretary-treasurer of Local 566 (laundry drivers) of the IBT and in 1925, he was elected president of the local, a position he still holds. In the latter year, the convention of the IBT was held in Seattle and Beck, who was chairman of the local committee, secretary of the committee on credentials, secretary of the committee on arrangements, and a member of the committee on constitution, made a good impression in attracting the attention of Tobin. He was thereupon appointed a general organizer.

When he left the employment of the laundry shortly afterwards, he gave up earnings of $100 a week and prospects of becoming general manager of a new string of laundries.[50]

Beck's vigor was soon apparent. His efforts to unionize Seattle teamsters made rapid progress and he was called upon for assistance by locals in the surrounding areas. Although at the outset his organizational endeavors were limited to Seattle and involved only teamsters, it was not long before they encompassed the whole West Coast and covered almost any workers who were not unionized. Seattle itself became a thoroughly unionized domain of the Teamsters Union. Many of Beck's successes depended on rough tactics although he was never directly implicated in any such activity. He seemed not to have been able to control all his men. During 1933, for example, when he was trying to organize a nonunion taxi company he told a mass rally of his members, "If you see any Yellow cabs, *don't* turn them over." That evening all yellow cabs that appeared on the streets were overturned.[51]

> On his way up . . . Beck was hardly regarded as one of Seattle's more prepossessing citizens. He was a vigorous sort of fellow, and his lieutenants didn't always try to win strikes through genteel picket lines and press releases. Odd things happened in the midst of organizing drives—unexplained explosions in the plants of uncooperative employers, cabs that were suddenly rammed and trucks that got overturned, and, on one occasion, a bit of embarrassing arson in Oregon. The word "goon" was coined in those years, and more than once Beck heard himself referred to as Seattle's "No. 1" representative of the species.[52]

Dave Beck used appropriate techniques to match the occasion and pursued relentless tactics. In order to prevent several threatened raids on his membership, Beck announced a program of boxing and wrestling for truck drivers in his region, and hired a new business agent—Leo Lomski—known in the prize ring as the "Aberdeen Assassin." [53] Beck succeeded in carving out a union

domain in which he organized not only teamsters but all other groups of workers which he could compel to join him, or which volunteered to do so.

In the mid-1930's, after he had weakened the will of many employers to resist him, Beck altered his techniques and began cooperating with business. He not only unfailingly kept the commitments he made in labor contracts but in addition took the position that the union should do all it could to make certain that the businesses in which its members were employed throve and prospered. The ability of employers to pay has been an important consideration in Beck's wage policy. With these objectives as a basis for action, teamsters refused to service new entrepreneurs in various fields when conditions appeared overcrowded or when cutthroat competition prevailed in the industry. Beck has insisted that he is seriously concerned with the welfare of the consumer. He maintains that in the 1930's the union occasionally undertook to regulate competition in order to prevent reductions in wages or the elimination of jobs. In the Seattle laundries, for example, commission rates for drivers were fixed on the basis of standard price scales and price wars vitally affected earnings.

Richard L. Neuberger, now a United States Senator from Oregon, wrote an article about Dave Beck in 1938 in which he quoted the teamster leader on the methods by which business could continue to operate on a profitable basis in Seattle.

> There are too many filling stations in Seattle. More are threatened. We're going to close some of them. First, I advise promoters against starting new stations. If that doesn't work, the Teamsters' Union simply will refuse to serve them. They won't last very long.[54]

Mayor John F. Dore of Seattle fully supported Beck. Said Dore: "Dave Beck runs this town and it's a good thing that he does." [55] When Dore was defeated early in 1938 in his bid for reelection to the mayoralty, some persons were convinced that a

decline in Dave Beck's power was imminent.[56] The relationship between Dore and Beck was strange indeed. Only a few years earlier, when Dore represented the brewery workers union, the two men had fought each other bitterly.

Beck assisted employers in a number of industries in setting up trade associations to prevent unfair methods of competition by newcomers, stop price wars, and enforce labor agreements. In almost every case, the teamsters signed contracts with such organized employers.[57]

It is not strange that employers were friendly to Beck and helped him build his power. The high esteem in which the business community held him stemmed from his "practical" approach and from the fact that he put almost no emphasis on idealistic actions and attitudes. But Beck fought hard for high wages. Since he regarded himself as a businessman, he tried to sell the labor of his members for the highest price he could get. Beck's aversion to strikes may be partially ascribed to the dismal failure of the general strike of 1919 conducted by the Industrial Workers of the World in Seattle. Although his opposition to sitdown strikes and mass picketing techniques has been clearly indicated by his actions over the years, he has demonstrated that he is able to conduct a vigorous strike. Beck has not opposed technological advance and mechanization of industry. As a result of his favorable attitude towards private enterprise and his philosophy of adherence to "business unionism" concepts, he has frequently been called upon to address business organizations. Beck leans toward the Republican party. In both 1948 and 1952, Beck voted for the Republican candidates for President of the United States; and in 1956, he again supported Eisenhower for President.[58]

Tobin at first was pleased with Beck's successes in increasing the strength of the IBT, but soon came to realize that Beck loomed as a rival of major stature. It was for this reason that Tobin constantly stressed the fact that the constitution of the international made no provision for any subdivisions in the union

other than locals and joint councils, that is, delegate bodies composed of representatives of the locals in a geographical region. On the other hand, in order to consolidate his growing power and hegemony, Beck undertook, in the middle of the 1930's, to create a unit within the IBT through which he could effectively wield control. At that time, local autonomy was curtailed only slightly by the powers vested in the joint council. Coördination of activities carried on by locals in the same city was slight and cooperation among those located in different cities was rare. Only in intercity trucking had regional organization begun. By 1937, despite the opposition of Tobin, Beck was strong enough to set up the Western Conference of Teamsters. The organization consisted of representatives from the joint councils and locals in the eleven western states and the Canadian province of British Columbia. Headquarters were located at Beck's home base in Seattle.

The establishment of the conference gave Beck considerable control over the affairs of the teamsters in the entire region. He was able to combine the financial resources of many locals and the work of numerous organizers. Unorganized employers in the small towns were warned that over-the-road drivers would halt deliveries if they did not recognize the Teamsters Union. Gradually, area-wide bargaining became the pattern and, in many cases, wage rates in the entire region were raised to the highest prevailing levels. Beck's organizing ability was demonstrated beyond doubt. The eleven states of the western conference contain only 13 per cent of the population of the United States, but over 25 per cent of the IBT membership.

Tobin, however, did not remain critical of the western conference too long. He sulked for a time when he found that he could not prevent its formation. But Tobin soon reversed his attitude and warmly praised this new method of administering the affairs of the union as a most worth-while contribution in advancing the interests of the IBT. At least in part Beck made the conference more palatable to Tobin by constantly repeating

the statement that it was a voluntary unit set up for the exchange of information and ideas and for consultation among the leadership and business agents of the union; and that in no way could it be considered to have the power or authority of compulsion in any of its recommendations. In practice the power was firmly settled in the hands of the conference chairman, Dave Beck. Tobin, who had never had too much influence on the Pacific Coast, recognized Beck as the "boss" of that region and permitted him to conduct union affairs free from interference. In 1940, Beck was elected a vice president of IBT.

Meanwhile, Beck became involved in other matters and his stature in the community rose rapidly. He joined the Elks and, in 1928, was elected exalted ruler of the lodge. He was prominent too both in the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. At the end of the 1920's, Beck served on the civil service commission of Seattle—for a time as chairman. He was also boxing commissioner of that city. In 1935 he was appointed to the board of prison terms and paroles of the state of Washington. Subsequently, in 1945, he was appointed a regent of the University of Washington and served for one year as president of the board.

When Tobin was reelected to the presidency of the IBT by the convention of 1947, he was authorized to appoint an executive vice president to assist him in carrying out his functions. This provision was approved by the convention because of Tobin's advanced age and because it recognized that he had to make some concessions to Beck, by whom he was hard pressed. Indeed, in 1948, Beck was powerful enough to force the international executive board to fire an editor of the union magazine from his post; the editor asserted that his dismissal was due to a long fight with Beck.[59] Union officials maintain, however, that the discharge resulted from a disagreement between the editor and Tobin.

At the end of 1947, Tobin designated Beck as executive vice president and from that time on Beck was considered the heir

apparent in the union. Under these circumstances Beck broadened his horizons and traveled extensively throughout the country on union business. Although, as a result, his influence grew somewhat, simultaneously a strong movement developed in various sections of the United States, outside of his own stronghold in the West, which sought to block his advancement to the presidency.

In the summer of 1952, Tobin reluctantly announced that he would not be a candidate for reelection but would support Beck as his successor. Beck's opponents in the union, however, were ready. A drive was begun by some of the eastern locals to push the candidacy of Willian A. Lee, an IBT vice president from Chicago.[60] When these efforts made very little headway, a number of locals from the East and Midwest launched a draft-Tobin movement. For a short time Tobin wavered in his resolution to retire. Indeed, Dave Beck, who was irked by these machinations, renominated Tobin at the 1952 convention. But this maneuver was only for the grandstands because James R. Hoffa, Beck's young rival in the Midwest, had come to Beck's support. Tobin knew then that he was beaten and declined to run. Instead, Tobin personally nominated Beck for the presidency. Beck was elected unanimously after having given private assurances that Tobin appointees with long seniority would not be ousted.

During 1953, it was rumored that Beck was considering the idea of joining with John L. Lewis of the miners, for whom he has some admiration, and David J. McDonald of the steelworkers in setting up a new federation, but there were no developments in that direction. In the middle of August, however, the AFL designated him the thirteenth vice president. The action was unanimous but George Meany and several other council members were distrustful of Beck. The question of giving the IBT two representatives on the executive council was raised, but the important factor was the struggle for power between Meany and

Beck. Upon taking his seat, Beck denied any intention of withdrawing the IBT from the AFL.[61]

In general, Beck feels considerable contempt for many labor leaders. Besides Meany, Beck's most active rival in the labor movement is Walter P. Reuther. Much of the friction between them developed from Reuther's charges, as president of the CIO, that Beck and the IBT were raiding CIO unions. To Beck, however, Reuther merely runs a large local dealing with one industry. When a reporter asked Beck what Reuther would think of one of his actions, he disdainfully said, "I don't give a damn what Reuther thinks! Who in the hell is Walter Reuther to me?" [62] Reuther reciprocates these feelings.

Upon Beck's request, in 1955, the IBT purchased his lakefront ranch house home located in a fashionable section of Seattle from him for $163,000, but he has continued to occupy it rent-free and with all operational expenses and taxes paid by the union. The purchase was justified on the grounds that a precedent had been established under Tobin and that Beck conducts some union business at home; the price was fixed by certified appraisers. He later requested the union to purchase the furniture and furnishings also, at a sum at first estimated between $30,000 and $100,000. But John F. English, the secretary-treasurer of the union, a devoted admirer of Tobin but hostile to Beck who had disparaged his financial competence and knowledge, refused to sign a check for the money despite the fact that the general executive board approved the acquisition in a telephone poll. Although no objection to the purchase was expressed at the next board meeting, English has refused to pay the money, set by Beck at $15,000, until authorized to do so by the convention.[63] These transactions were strongly condemned in the press.

Dave Beck is forceful and somewhat overpowering and his energy appears inexhaustible. He is a pleasant, heavy-set man with a round and florid face, who likes both publicity and power but is not bothered much by criticism. Beck strives for respectability through the attainment of social status and financial

security. When interviewed, he answers all questions with few efforts at equivocation, but he has the habit of making exaggerated claims. He permits views contrary to his own to be expressed, but is not easily upset. One question may be answered in a voice which is alternately softly modulated and vibrantly booming. Beck wears custom-made suits, dines at the best restaurants, and stays at the finest hotels when away from home. He is a relatively lavish host but neither drinks liquor nor smokes. Only rarely does he gamble, swear, or shout. Beck's wealth and resources, much of which were acquired in real estate transactions in Seattle, are reputed large enough to classify him as a millionaire. Dave Beck has spent his life trying to achieve a status of respectability both for himself and his union. At the beginning of 1957, he was delighted to become a member of the executive committee of the International Transport Workers Federation.

Beck expected to run again for president of the IBT in 1957. He had maintained, however, that if elected it would be his final term in deference to his age at the time of the next election. Beck had not intended to recommend a successor but to allow the convention to follow its own inclination. He has said that Hoffa is a good man for the post but seemed to prefer Brewster.

The astounding disclosures made by the McClellan committee appear likely to foreclose the possibility that Beck will seek re-election.[64] On March 29, 1957, the executive council of the AFL-CIO unanimously suspended Beck from the office of vice president of the Federation for taking the Fifth Amendment and refusing to testify before a Senate committee about his financial affairs and stewardship of union funds.[65] Beck, however, challenged the authority of the council to take this action.

Although the power of the Teamsters Union has not been significantly impaired, public reaction has been extremely unfavorable. Removal of the taint of corruption currently ascribed to the leadership becomes a matter of primary importance to the union.

Tobin held control of the Teamsters Union for forty-five years but, in 1952, he was forced to relinquish power to Beck. Tobin was favored by general economic conditions in building the union during the second decade of the twentieth century. As orders from European belligerents flowed into this country, employers found their profits increasing and were less reluctant to deal with unions. Circumstances were even more propitious for unionization after the United States entered the First World War. Not only did business activity increase further, but the federal government pursued a deliberate policy of encouraging the growth of unions.

The Teamsters Union experienced many of the difficulties confronting the rest of the labor movement during the 1920's and like most other labor organizations lost part of its membership. Development of giant corporations and mass production techniques, migration of industry, decline of immigration, and the rise of real income were responsible both for retarding the organizing activities of workers and making employees more apathetic to unionism. Employers developed vigorous policies to combat and disrupt unionization. Personnel departments were set up, company unions were encouraged, and labor injunctions were used with great frequency.

The 1930's, however, witnessed a marked reversal in the fortunes of American unions, including the IBT. Revival of union activity and growth of membership were primarily the result of the favorable environment created by the changed attitude of the federal government towards the labor movement. Unions were given a prominent role to play in the efforts of the administration to bring an end to the depression. Workers became disillusioned with the operation of "welfare capitalism" and more skeptical of unrestricted private enterprise. Unions developed new militancy.

By 1940, the IBT was a powerful trade union. Its economic strength was substantially independent of general business conditions in the United States. Its structure was being modified to meet new developments and its government was geared to the needs of the situation and the leaders.

negative. The union turned down an application from a group of workers in Honolulu, Hawaii, because it felt that they were geographically too remote from headquarters. A decade afterwards, however, in 1946, Beck himself prevailed upon the general executive board to undertake organizational work in that region of the world. Although women are now eligible for membership in the union, the IBT has generally not been disposed to admit them. As late as the Second World War they were only temporarily admitted by the Chicago locals, with the distinct understanding that their membership would cease at the end of the emergency.[13]

In a roundabout manner Tobin opposed the employment of women as taxicab drivers. In 1918, he wrote:

> . . . while we are not opposed to women in any way, shape or manner, we are of the opinion, to say the least, that the employment is degrading to women. . . . At night time, while the taxicab drivers pick up respectable citizens, they also pick up some of the other class. . . . The thought of having a modest, clean, good-living young woman employed in this service is nauseating. . . . It takes a man with courage and strength to engage in the employment mentioned above.[14]

The question of racial discrimination has been relatively unimportant in the Teamsters Union. In 1908, the general executive board chartered a Negro local when the white local in the area refused to accept Negroes as members or to organize the colored men separately;[15] but in 1946, the board refused to grant a separate charter to a group of colored livery drivers who requested one.[16] The IBT undertook an organizing campaign in 1906 among Negro teamsters in the South to strengthen their trade union allegiances and reduce their inclination to serve as strikebreakers.[17] A decade later, Tobin was accused by an IBT local in Pittsburgh, comprised of Negro workers hauling refuse, of having rendered an unjust decision when he required it to fulfill its contract obligations. The local contended that the

decision hinged on the fact that its members were colored. Tobin denied the charges and in the process implied that the finances of the local were not in order.[18] In 1955, a number of locals of the Teamsters Union in the New York metropolitan area, which came over from the brewery union two years before, was charged with discriminating against Negroes employed in the brewery industry. An inconclusive investigation and hearings were conducted by the New York State Commission against Discrimination and although the locals involved denied the charges, they nevertheless agreed to modify job referral policies and grant to fourteen complaining Negroes their appropriate seniority rights and status. Local 1345, with jurisdiction over bottle delivery, bottle shop work, and warehouse employment in the beer industry, was at the center of the controversy.[19]

The many differences in the jobs held by members of the union have necessitated a large variety of locals. During the past decade the IBT has averaged about 800 local unions of all kinds. A random selection from the roster of locals clearly indicates this condition. There are, among others, locals of chicken drivers, city employees, clothing drivers, bakery drivers, milk wagon drivers, funeral chauffeurs, armored car chauffeurs, general warehousemen, gas station operators, coal drivers, and general truck drivers. Such differentiation is not made consistently in all places but has been a convenient device for preventing a local from growing too large and unwieldy. It has also enabled a local to concentrate on problems peculiar to its members. In smaller cities, however, locals may be conglomerated organizations whose members come from diverse occupations.

Many types of workers other than drivers are part of the union, but even among truck drivers there are significant distinctions in conditions of employment. Pay may be based on commission earned, mileage driven, hours worked, or trips made. The impact of seasonal activity on the various occupations performed by members of the union may be significant. The degree of governmental supervision and regulation of workers in the

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